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Punitive Damages in Cyberspace: Where in
the World is the Consumer?
Michael L. Rustad∗
I.

INTRODUCTION**

The Internet offers American consumers a global
marketplace open 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. By 2004,
online commerce is projected to account for nearly seven trillion
dollars.1 Currently, there are 262.3 million English-speaking
Internet users with 280 million projected for 2004.2
The
worldwide online population is projected to be between 709 and
945 million.3 In the United States there are 182.1 million people
online, accounting for 65% of that population.4 ìWith the ability
to reach millions of Internet users simply by establishing a
website, tens of thousands of companies are expected to take
advantage of electronic commerce, ëredefining and restructuring
the distribution of goods and services.íî5
∗
Michael L. Rustad, Ph.D., J.D., LL.M. is the Thomas F. Lambert Jr. Professor of Law
and Co-Director of the Intellectual Property Law Concentration at the Suffolk University
Law School in Boston. Sandra Paulsson, who is a law graduate of the University of Lund
in Sweden and an LL.M. student at Suffolk, provided excellent research and editorial
assistance. I would also like to thank my wife, Chryss J. Knowles, for her editorial
suggestions. Finally, I would like to express sincere appreciation to my research
assistants Michael J. Bauer and Patty Nagle for their diligence, and to the entire
Chapman Law Review staff, and in particular to Kenny Saffles, Brian Bedinghaus, Trent
Evans, Sherry Fuller, Kevin Morriss, Steve Ruden, and Matt Taylor for their efforts in
editing this article.
∗∗
The research for this article included examining several cases only available in jury
verdict databases and jury verdict reporting publications. These cases were obtained
from LEXIS, Verdict Library, Allver File; and WESTLAW, LRP-JV database (Jury
Verdict and Settlement Summaries). Citations to these jury verdict databases are made
to the LEXIS or WESTLAW database.
1 Forrester
Projects $6.8 Trillion for 2004 ($ B), Global Reach, at
http://glreach.com/eng/ed/art/2004.ecommerce.php3 (last revised Nov. 23, 2001).
2 Global Internet Statistics (by Language), Global Reach, at http://www.glreach.com/
globstats/ (last revised Sept. 30, 2003).
3 CyberAtlas staff, Population Explosion!, ClickZ Network, at http://www.clickz.com
/stats/big_picture/geographics/print.php/5911_151151 (Sept. 22, 2003).
4 Id.
5 Brian K. Epps, Maritz, Inc. v. CyberGold, Inc.: The Expansion of Personal
Jurisdiction in the Modern Age of Internet Advertising, 32 GA. L. REV. 237, 239 (1997)
(quoting Louise Kehoe, Surge of Business Interest, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 1, 1995, at
XVIII).
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The risks to consumers in this global marketplace are many.
Consumers are flooded with virus-infected e-mail, spam, and a
variety of fraudulent online scams. Online criminals use the
technique of ìphishingî to trick consumers into giving their credit
card numbers by sending fraudulent e-mails posing as banks,
financial service providers, or Internet Service Providers (ìISPî).6
The e-mails often have direct hyperlinks to unaffiliated web sites
that mirror the sites of trusted institutions.7
The Internet makes it effortless for impostors to assume
false identities, and therefore, it is a seamless haven for identity
theft. The seamy side of the Internet is rapidly becoming a
global Petri dish for new torts and crimes perpetrated against
consumers. Consumers face a multitude of potential risks as the
result of unsavory practices by Internet retailers. The following
three horror stories illustrate the systematic ways wrongdoers
are preying upon consumers in cyberspace:
The Naked Internet ConsumeróIn June of 2001, Eli Lilly
and Co. inadvertently released the e-mail addresses of 669
medical patients who had registered at its web site8 to receive
messages regarding health-related matters, such as reminders to
take certain medications.9 Eli Lilly settled with the states, but
no individual obtained a damages award in this significant
compromising of consumer privacy.10
Consumers as ìPhishî Food in Online AuctionsóThe
majority of consumer frauds arise out of online auction sales.11
This is due in large part to online fraudsters who use a technique
called ìphishingî to defraud consumers who use eBay.12 When
phishing, a con artist sends a consumer what appears to be an
ìëofficialí e-mail message directing the person to a counterfeit site
where they are encouraged to ëupdate their account.íî13 The
Cade Metz, Can E-Mail Survive?, PC MAG., Feb. 17, 2004, at 65, 66.
Troy Wolverton, Wells Fargo Latest Target in Scams, CNET News.com, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1017-857177.html (last modified Mar. 11, 2002).
8 Eli Lilly Strikes Deal Ending E-Mail Privacy Suit by Eight States, 4 E-BUS. L.
BULL. 14, 14 (2002) [hereinafter Eli Lilly].
9 Julekha Dash, ACLU Knocks Eli Lilly for Divulging E-Mail Addresses,
Computerworld, http://www.computerworld.com/managementtopics/ebusiness/story/0,108
01,62050,00.html (July 9, 2001).
10 The settlement of the e-mail privacy lawsuit was with the states of California,
Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont. Eli Lilly,
supra note 8, at 14.
11 Internet
Fraud Statistics, National Fraud Information Center, at
http://www.fraud.org/2002intstats.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Internet
Fraud Statistics].
12 eBay Email Hoax and Web Page, at http://www.millersmiles.co.uk/identitytheft/10
1303ebay1.htm (Oct. 13, 2003) (noting that since October 2003 there has been a hoax web
page to capture consumer information).
13 Kyle Stock, Auction Site Can Turn Crime Scene for Unwary, POST & COURIER
6
7
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criminal uses the information provided by the consumer to hijack
his or her credit card and identity.14 A survey of Internet fraud
found that online auctions accounted for 90% of consumer losses
in 2002.15 The governmentís Internet Fraud Complaint Center
reports that online auction fraud has comprised 46% of complaint
referrals since 2000.16
Stalking Children in the Internetís Red Light DistrictóCon
artists frequently target children online. In one instance, a
notorious ìtyposquatterî registered domain names that employed
misspellings of other popular Internet domain names for
children-oriented websites, such as Teletubbies and Disneyland,
in order to attract children to adult entertainment sites.17 When
children accidentally misspelled the domain names for the
childrenís sites, they were redirected to adult entertainment sites
where fees were automatically charged for each childís click
stream.18
As demonstrated by the above examples, many of the online
injuries suffered by consumers are the product of truly
reprehensible wrongdoing deserving of punitive damages. This
Article presents the results of the first empirical study of the role
that punitive damages have played in redressing consumer
injuries during the first decade of Internet-related litigation. It
provides definitive data on the number, size, post-verdict history,
and factual circumstances underlying punitive damages in
cyberspace. Currently, punitive damages play no meaningful
role in protecting consumers in cyberspace despite the epidemic
of wrongdoing that goes undetected and unpunished by public
authorities.
Tort law has always evolved to address new forms of
misbehavior. In the latter half of the twentieth century punitive
damages were awarded against product manufacturers who
(Charleston,
S.C.),
Dec.
26,
2003,
at
1A,
11A,
available
at
http://www.charleston.net/stories/122603/loc_26ebay.shtml.
14 Id.
15 Internet Fraud Statistics, supra note 11.
16 NATíL WHITE COLLAR CRIME CTR. & FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, IFCC 2002
INTERNET
FRAUD
REPORT
3
(2003),
available
at
http://www.ifccfbi.gov/strategy/statistics.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 2003) [hereinafter IFCC
2002 INTERNET FRAUD REPORT].
17 US Authorities Redirect ëMost Wantedí Cybersquatter to Jail, INTERNET MAG. 011
(Nov. 2003) (ìJohn Zuccarini registered common misspellings of the names of popular
childrenís websites . . . and earned up to $1 million (£600,000) per year in affiliate
commissions by redirecting people to pornographic websites. Visitors to the sites were
often trapped by pop up ads, forcing them to reboot their computers.î),
http://web2.infotrac-custom.com/pdfserve/get_item/1/s4waebw3_2/sb635_02.pdf
[hereinafter US Authorities].
18 Feds Nab Alleged Porn Piper, at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/04/tech/
printable571499.shtml (Sep. 4, 2003).
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knowingly marketed their products with excessive, preventable
danger.19 Tort remedies have the potential of filling the gap left
by ineffective criminal sanctions against cyberwrongs such as
online stalking.20 Public enforcement needs to be augmented by
consumers operating as ìprivate attorneys generalî21 who pursue
punitive justice against corporate wrongdoers. ìThe primary
function of punitive damages is to punish, to deter private actors
from making particularly egregious decisions harmful to
society.î22
Part II examines the case characteristics of Internet lawsuits
where plaintiffs initiated causes of action in state and federal
courts in the United States between 1992 and 2002.23 The
analysis of plaintiffsí victories in Internet cases has a domestic
focus, employing a database that includes virtually all U.S.
plaintiff victories in Internet cases. This database permits the
first comprehensive examination of: (1) the frequency of punitive
damages in Internet cases; (2) the specific causes of action on
which the remedy was based; (3) plaintiff and defendant
characteristics; and (4) the role punitive damages plays in the
cyber-litigation system. A content analysis of all Internet-related
cases reveals that no consumer obtained punitive damages
during a decade of cyberlaw litigation.24
19 See Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing
Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REV. 1, 16, 18 nn.87-88 (1992) (noting
that punitive damages in products liability cases evolved as a remedy beginning in the
mid-1960s).
20 Lisa A. Karczewski, Comment, Stalking in Cyberspace: The Expansion of
Californiaís Current Anti-Stalking Laws in the Age of the Internet, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV.
517, 518 (1999) (arguing that the legal system has yet to develop effective remedies
against online stalking).
21 Judge Jerome Frank of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals coined the term
ìprivate Attorney Generals [sic]î to refer to ìany person, official or not,î who brought a
proceeding ìeven if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public interest.î Associated Indus.
of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943), vacated, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
See generally Michael L. Rustad, Smoke Signals from Private Attorneys General in Mega
Social Policy Cases, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 511, 518 (2001) (arguing that ì[t]he rubric under
which all the definitions for the private attorneys general fall is the emphasis on private
action for the public interest. It is only the possibility of private attorneys general
receiving a contingency fee that permits lawsuits to be brought to vindicate the public
interestî).
22 In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
23 The only foreign cases included in the research universe were lawsuits filed
against non-U.S. defendants in state or federal courts.
24 The definition of a consumer for purposes used in this study is used by many state
and federal statutes. A consumer transaction in cyberspace includes commercial
transactions in which an individual is purchasing goods or services online for personal,
family or household use. The definition of consumer is widely accepted and incorporated
in such consumer statutes as the Truth in Lending Act (ìTILAî). TILAís scope is limited
to ìconsumerî credit transactions, which are defined as transactions in which ìthe money,
property, or services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes.î 15 U.S.C. ß 1602(h) (1998).
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At present, punitive damages serve as a form of corporate
self-help to assist corporations in protecting rights and
consolidating market share in cyberspace. Part III explores the
reasons why punitive damages have not yet developed as a
consumer protection remedy in cyberspace. This Article will
demonstrate that punitive damages are a necessary deterrent
against Internet wrongdoers where the probability of discovery is
low and the harm to consumers is generally undetected and
unpunished by public authorities.
II. EMPIRICAL STUDY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN
CYBERSPACE
A.

Research Methods

To obtain a more complete understanding of the roles that
judges and juries play in the rapidly evolving arena of cyberspace
litigation, all Internet-related cases in which a plaintiff received
a punitive damages award were surveyed. This database of
punitive damages awards in cyberspace was drawn from a
variety of published and unpublished court opinions from the
decade of 1992 to 2002. The appendix to this article describes the
research methods and sources consulted to assemble the
database on punitive damages in cyberspace. The research
universe for this study is all Internet-related cases decided in
state and federal courts during the first decade of Internet
litigation.25 Each of the reported findings is drawn from a larger
universe of 484 cases in which plaintiffs received legal or
equitable relief in an Internet-related case in a U.S. state or
federal court between 1992-2002. The research findings reported
below focus upon the cases in which prevailing cybertort
plaintiffs received a punitive damages award.

25 For each Internet case, background information and data was compiled on the
characteristics of plaintiffs, defendants, size of awards, and post-trial adjustments.

RUSTAD FINAL - MAY 28

5/28/2004 4:30 PM

2004]

B.

Chapman Law Review

44

Research Findings
1. Punitive Damages in Cyberspace Are Increasing and
Being Awarded at a Higher Rate than in Traditional Tort
Caseloads

Table One

Internet-Related Punitive Damages Awarded
1992-2002
N=49
16
14
12
10
8
6

Count

4
2
0
1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

Year of Plaintiff Win

Table One depicts the forty-nine Internet related cases in
which a plaintiff received a punitive damages award in all state
and federal courts for the decade ranging from 1992 to 2002. The
overall rate of punitive damages was roughly 10% of all Internet
cases (49 of 484) in which either equitable or legal remedies were
granted. Punitive damages are far more likely to be awarded in
cybertort cases in which at least some monetary award was
made. In the 187 cyberspace cases where money damages were
awarded, punitive damages were also assessed in 49 cases (26%).
Table One suggests that the overall rate of punitive damages
is greater in the Internet realm than in the real space world. All
of the empirical studies of punitive damages agree that the rate
of punitive damages is less than one in ten in cases where the
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plaintiff prevailed.26 The most comprehensive study of punitive
damages in state courts was completed by researchers at the
Bureau of Justice Statistics (ìBJSî).27 The BJS study of civil
courts of seventy-five of the largest American counties found that
ì[o]f the 12,026 verdicts in the sample, plaintiffs won a total of
364 punitive damages awards,î which was less than 6% of the
cases.28 All prior empirical studies of the rate of punitive
damages confirm that the overall rate is substantially lower than
in cyberspace cases.29 The higher overall rate of punitive
damages may be explained by the fact that every case involved a
defendant whose conduct was intentional. Another explanation
would be that many of the cases involved repeat offenders such
as spammers, pornographers, or wrongdoers who fled the
jurisdiction.
Still, there were less than fifty punitive damages awards in a
decade in all state and federal courts. The high-water mark for
punitive damages in Internet cases occurred in 2001 with a total
of only fifteen awards in all state and federal courts. As these
numbers demonstrate, punitive damages are still a thimble-full
of cases in the ocean of litigation.

As one scholar reports:
Studies conducted by researchers at the RAND Corporation found that
punitive damages are only awarded in 1-8% of civil cases. Other studies have
found punitive damages to be awarded at similar rates. In the sample of cases
examined by Daniels and Martin, punitive damages were awarded in only 4.9%
of civil cases and in 8.8% of cases in which the plaintiff prevailed.
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and
Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 161 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
27 Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Depít of Justice, Civil Justice Statistics, at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/civil.htm (last revised Oct. 1, 2001).
28 Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093,
1127 (1996).
29 Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling Punitive Damages: Current Data and Further
Inquiry, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 15, 17-33 (1998) (reporting the results of nine empirical studies
of punitive damages and concluding that the rate of punitive damages is low).
26
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Show Me the Money: Punitive Damages Are Mostly
Found in Intentional Tort Cases Filed By Businesses To
Recoup Economic Loss

Table Two

Punitive Damages by Cybertort Type
N=49
T respass to Chattels
10%

Non-T ort
8%

Defam ation
29%
Business T ort/Fraud
45%

Invasion of Privacy
2%
Other Intentional
6%

The first decade of punitive damages in cyberspace shares
common ground with eighteenth-century English law where the
elite used the legal system to achieve greater power.30 Forty-five
of the forty-nine punitive damages awards arose out of
predominately cybertort cases, but every tort cause of action in
the cyberlaw punitive damages sample arose out of an
intentional tort. Most punitive awards arose in business tort
cases filed by online or bricks-and-mortar31 businesses.
Cybertort punitive damages were predominately awarded in
30 Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American
Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 11 (2002)
(describing Blackstoneís Commentaries on English Law as reflecting the values of
property owners and wealthy elites) [hereinafter Rustad & Koenig, Taming the Tort
Monster].
31 A bricks-and-mortar business is an established company with a physical
headquarters in the real space world as opposed to a purely online business with only a
virtual presence.
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economic loss cases rather than personal injury cases, which are
the province of traditional tort law. Punitive damages in
Internet-related cases have not yet developed in cases based
upon negligence or strict liability.
The few cases where individuals obtained punitive damages
often were in cases involving reputation or privacy injuries.32 In
fact, online defamation cases alone accounted for 29% of all
punitive damages awarded in cyberspace cases during the tenyear period of the study.33 For example, a doctor defamed by an
Internet posting charging him with taking kickbacks led to a
punitive damages award.34 In another case, a University of
North Dakota physics professor won a large punitive damages
award against a former graduate student who accused him in
online postings ìof being a pedophile and having odd sexual
habits.î35 In a Florida case awarding punitive damages, an
Internet web page contained numerous defamatory postings
pertaining to the plaintiff and his children.36
The most interesting aspect of Table Two is the cases that
were not developed.
No consumer was awarded punitive
damages in a products liability action for bad software, the
transmittal of a virus, or a faulty Internet security product. No
consumer prevailed in a medical malpractice case arising out of
telemedicine.37 Moreover, not a single punitive damages award
was handed out in any substantive area of the law predicated
upon either negligence or strict liability.
Surprisingly, there were no personal injury lawsuits arising
out of a decade of Internet sales or services. Punitive damages in
cyberspace cases were predicated upon intentional tort causes of
action, generally in business disputes. The business tort cases,
32 See infra Appendix A. See also Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, No. 780187, 2001
WL 1904203 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 17, 2001) (assessing $350,000 in punitive damages for
ìmore than 14,000 defamatory and sometimes vulgar messages on more than 100 Internet
message boardsî accusing company executives of having illicit sexual relations and other
bad acts).
33 See, e.g., Matos v. Am. Fedín of State, County & Mun. Employees, No.
CV980578747, 2001 WL 1044632, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 13, 2001) (reporting
defamation claim by corrections department employee against union).
34 Graham v. Oppenheimer, JVR No. 382280, 2000 WL 33232110 (E.D. Va. Oct.
2000) (awarding $350,000 in punitive damages).
35 Scott Carlson, North Dakota Professor Sues Former Student and a Web Site Over
Allegations in an Article, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 19, 2001, at A33.
36 Bagwell v. Phillips, No. 97-13631, 1998 WL 1656174 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 23, 1998)
(awarding $15,000 in punitive damages).
37 ìThe Institute of Medicine has defined telemedicine to encompass telephone, video
and electronic transmission of medical information using telephone or digital technology.î
Alissa R. Spielberg, Online Without a Net: Physician-Patient Communication by
Electronic Mail, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 267, 287-88 (1999) (citing COMM. ON EVALUATING
CLINICAL APPLICATIONS OF TELEMEDICINE, INST. OF MED., TELEMEDICINE: A GUIDE TO
ASSESSING TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN HEALTHCARE 16-17 (1996)).
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which accounted for nearly half of the punitive damages awards
(45%), included actions for the intentional interference with
contract, unfair and deceptive trade practices, intentional
interference
with
economic
opportunities,
intentional
interference
with
noncommercial
opportunities,
unfair
competition,
fraudulent
misrepresentation,
and
the
misappropriation of trade secrets.
However, most of the
Internet-related business tort cases involved large companies
suing rivals or other companies interfering with their
businesses.38
A typical business tort case where punitive damages were
awarded occurred when one dot-com company sued another dotcom over a generic domain name.39 Punitive damages were also
awarded in a wrongful discharge case against a former dot-com
company.40 Bitter internecine business disputes between online
companies and employees accounted for another large segment of
cases.41
The legally protected interest in the vast majority of
cybertort awards was to protect intellectual property interests
such as trademarks, domain names, or trade secrets. A court
levied a $65 million judgment against an online pornographer for
pirating the sex.com domain name.42 The courtís award included
$25 million in punitive damages to punish the defendantís
fraudulent scheme perpetrated by a forged letter to a domain
name registrar.43
In Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast
Entertainment Corp.,44 the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
38 See, e.g., eBay, Inc. v. Bidderís Edge, Inc., 56 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1856 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (involving rival Internet companies suing over alleged anticompetitive conduct,
such as tortious interference with an advertising contract).
39 Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Shifting the Paradigm in E-Commerce: Move Over
Inherently Distinctive Trademarks ñ The E-Brand, I-Brand and Generic Domain Names
Ascending to Power?, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 937, 977 (2001) (describing a case where Ecards.com was awarded $1 million in punitive damages in its unfair competition action
against Ecards.com).
40 Moreau v. Direct Express, No. BC 222666, 2001 WL 761748, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Mar. 21, 2001).
41 See, e.g., Home Interactive Corporation Wins $11 Million Verdict, at
http://www.marketwire.com/mw/release_html_b1?release_id=36285 (Dec. 21, 2001)
(reporting that a jury ordered the former president of a software company to pay punitive
damages for stealing company property, disabling the plaintiffís web site, emptying the
companyís bank account, and generally interfering with the plaintiffís business after he
resigned).
42 Laurie J. Flynn, Cybersquatting Draws Heavy Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2001,
at C4.
43 Robyn
Weisman, Sex.com Plaintiff to Get US $65 Million, at
http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/story/8699.html (Apr. 4, 2001). See Kremen v. Cohen, 325
F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2003) (certifying question to the California Supreme Court).
44 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
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courtís denial of an injunction prohibiting a competitorís use of its
rivalís trademark in a domain name as well as in metatags on its
web site.45 The dispute grew out of the defendantís use of
metatags with its rivalís trademark to increase the traffic to
another web site. The court compared the misuse of metatags
and the diversion of web traffic from the rightful trademark
ownerís site to ìposting a sign with anotherís trademark in front
of oneís store.î46 On remand, the District Court denied summary
judgment for punitive damages, holding that there was a triable
fact as to whether West Coast was aware of Brookfieldís rights at
the time.47
The dataset demonstrates that punitive damages have not
yet evolved as a sanction to punish and deter unfair or deceptive
practices against consumers in cyberspace. Few plaintiffs found
any legal remedy for violations of Internet security, data mining,
or the invasion of privacy, although hardly a day passes when
there is not a media account of some egregious breach of Internet
privacy.

Id. at 1066-67.
Metatags are HTML code intended to describe the contents of the web site.
There are different types of metatags, but those of principal concern to us are
the ìdescriptionî and ìkeywordî metatags. The description metatags are
intended to describe the web site; the keyword metatags, at least in theory,
contain keywords relating to the contents of the web site.
Id. at 1045.
46 Id. at 1064.
47 Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entmít Corp., No. CV 98-9074, 1999
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23251, at *25-26, 28 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 1999).
45
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Punitive Damages Do Not Arise Out of Consumer
Transactions

Table Three

Punitive Damages by Plaintiff Type
N=49
Other Organization
4%
Nat'l/Internat'l Co.
16%

Medium Corporation
14%

Indiv idual
53%

Sm all Corp/W ebsite
12%

Many individual plaintiffs obtained punitive damages for
aggravated misconduct growing out of the employment
relationship. Although individuals were the largest prevailing
plaintiff category, these cases did not arise out of business-toconsumer transactions. For example, no consumer won an award
against an Internet seller or renderer of services in a decade of
cyberlaw cases.48 Rather, 100% of the punitive damages awarded
to individuals in cyberlaw cases were non-consumer in nature. It
is remarkable that for a ten year period, in all U.S. federal and
state courts, not a single consumer prevailed in a cyberlaw case
in which punitive damages were awarded.
Individuals were the plaintiffs in one of every two punitive
damages verdicts in Internet tort cases. However, punitive
damages in cyberlaw cases played no meaningful role as a means
of consumer protection for individuals. In a decade of punitive
48 The plaintiff and defendant characteristic as well as the aggravating
circumstances for each of the forty-nine cyberlaw cases were systematically coded. See
infra Appendix A.
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damages awards, no case arose out of an online sale or service
which could be classified as a consumer transaction.49 Punitive
damages, for example, were not awarded for the failure of online
merchants to deliver goods or defective software. Furthermore,
no consumer received punitive damages for non-consented
transfers of their personal information.
Punitive damages awarded in favor of individuals arose out
of non-consumer contexts such as the employment relationship
or in disputes between individuals. When punitive damages
were awarded to individuals, it was often in the context of ugly
disputes arising out of incendiary exchanges on listservs, web
sites, or e-mails.
Nasty neighborhood disputes sometimes
morphed into full-scale punitive damages warfare. The category
of cases awarding punitive damages to individuals involved
online stalkers,50 vengeful neighbors,51 and sexual harassers.52
For example, when a neighbor published derogatory statements
on an Internet web page about a family, the target obtained
In that case, the
punitive damages in a Florida court.53
defendant also published photographs of the plaintiffís minor
child as well as the childís name, address, and telephone number
on the web site.54 The plaintiffís punitive damages award was
based on the common law torts of trespass, slander, nuisance,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.55
Many of these non-consumer cases involved business torts
where an individual filed suit against a company. In one highly
publicized case, two former research scientists employed by a
high tech company published over 14,000 defamatory and vulgar
messages on their web site and on over 100 Internet message
boards.56 The postings targeted two current corporate executives,
49 The Magnuson-Moss WarrantyóFederal Trade Commission Improvement Act, for
example, defines consumer products as meaning ìany tangible personal property which is
distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or household
purposes.î 15 U.S.C. ß 2301(1) (1998). Consumers are defined in the online context as a
plaintiff filing an action against a seller or provider of services for actions such as the
invasion of privacy, release of defective software, failure to deliver merchandise or similar
actions.
50 Tim Doulin, Jurors Order Stalker to Pay Victims for Internet Harassment,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Ohio), Feb. 21, 2002, at C12 (awarding $105,000 to two female
musicians who were stalked over the Internet).
51 Bagwell v. Phillips, No. 97-13631, 1998 WL 1656174 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 23, 1998).
52 See, e.g., Butler v. Krebs, No. 96-1204096, 1998 WL 2023763 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June
8, 1998) (awarding punitive damages against a Continental Express pilot for
superimposing plaintiffís photograph onto other female bodies and transmitting the
images over the Internet).
53 Bagwell, 1998 WL 1656174.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Varian Med. Sys., Inc. v. Delfino, No. 780187, 2001 WL 1904203 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Dec. 17, 2001) (noting that plaintiffs alleged libel, invasion of privacy, breach of contract,
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accusing them of ìhaving extramarital affairs, videotaping office
bathrooms, chronically lying and hallucinating.î57 In another
case, a urologist obtained punitive damages against a defendant
pathologist and his affiliated medical corporation for anonymous
postings on the Internet.58 Punitive damages were based upon
the false accusation that the plaintiff was accepting kickbacks
from a bidding company.59
Many individual plaintiffs obtained punitive damages for
aggravated wrongdoings growing out of the employment
relationship. In one bizarre case, a female employee received
punitive damages when another employee and his son used the
Internet to harrass her by exposing her to web sites devoted to
sexual perversion.60 In another instance, Internet America and
its executives were assessed $100,000 in punitive damages, with
a total verdict of more than $6 million, in an Internet-related
lawsuit for defrauding their former financial officer.61 The
former Internet America executiveís contention was that the
president of the company defrauded her by convincing her to sell
off her stock at a mere $0.80 per share just prior to a successful
Initial Public Offering (ìIPOî).62
The second largest plaintiff category is national or
international corporations (16%) followed by medium (14%) and
small (12%) companies.
Court decisions have aided large
stakeholders in expanding their identity and intellectual
property rights in the new economy. The typical business
plaintiff is a ìrepeat playerî or a large corporation with
substantial legal and financial resources, such as Playboy
Enterprises and America Online (ìAOLî).63 According to the
survey of cases, the largest stakeholders of the Internet economy
and unfair business practices, and sought compensatory and punitive damages).
57 Id. ìA Santa Clara County jury awarded $775,000 in compensatory and punitive
damages to a business and two of its employees after finding two former employees had
libeled the plaintiffs with defamatory and vulgar statements posted on the Internet.î Id.
58 Graham v. Oppenheimer, No. 00-CV-57, 2000 WL 33381418, at *1 (E.D. Va. Dec.
15, 2000).
59 Id. See also Graham v. Oppenheimer, JVR No. 382280, 2000 WL 33232110 (E.D.
Va. Oct. 2000).
60 Kelly v. Whitley County, No. 00-CV-388, 2002 WL 31932414 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 18,
2002) (awarding $230,000 damages against jailor and county in case involving retaliatory
discharge).
61 Carradine v. Internet Am. Inc., No. 05-01-01577-CV, 2001 WL 1825528 (Tex. Dist.
Ct. Mar. 26, 2001), vacated, 106 S.W.3d 906 (Tex. App. 2003) (vacating due to settlement).
62 Id.
63 See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Natíl Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890
(N.D. Iowa 2001) (awarding $100,000 punitive damages for willful and wanton actions);
Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, No. 98-0011-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20448 (E.D. Va. Nov. 20,
1998) (magistrateís report recommending award of punitive damages for bad faith
actions), affíd No. 98-0011-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20645 (E.D. Va. Dec. 30, 1998). See
also cases cited infra notes 156, 157, 164.
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were using punitive damages as a tool for consolidating their
market share in the Internet economy. Therefore, most cyberlaw
cases in the business context feature large Internet companies
suing newly-established companies or individuals.
Cybersquatters64 were frequently sued by powerful Internet
John
industry stakeholders for trademark infringement.65
Zuccarini, a notorious cybersquatter, earned millions by
registering domain names based upon the common misspellings
of trademarks, a practice called ìtyposquatting.î66 For example,
in one case, Zuccarini was ordered to pay damages and attorney
fees based upon a finding that the defendantís use of domain
names was ìconfusingly similar,î thereby constituting a violation
of the federal Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act,67
and an infringement of a famous trademark68 The court ordered
greater damages because the defendant was a recidivist who had
been enjoined from registering misspelled names in suits brought
by other companies.69 In another case, America Online sought
injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages
against AT&T, a competing ISP, in a trademark infringement
action because AT&T was using the terms ìBuddy List,î ìYou
have Mail!,î and ìIM Here.î70
While large corporations are often plaintiffs in these cases,
they rarely find themselves on the defense side of cyberlaw
lawsuits.
In cases where large corporations were named
defendants, punitive damages were rarely awarded.71 Likewise,
the government was a defendant in fewer than 2% of cyberlaw
casesóprimarily Internet speech cases. Again, punitive damages

64 Cybersquatting is ìthe practice of registering ëwell-known brand names as
Internet domain namesí in order to force the rightful owners of the marks ëto pay for the
right to engage in electronic commerce under their own brand name.íî Virtual Works, Inc.
v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 267 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting S. REP. NO. 106140, at 5 (1999)).
65 See, e.g., Shields v. Zuccarini, 254 F.3d 476, 479-81, 487 (3d Cir. 2001); Elecs.
Boutique Holdings Corp. v. Zuccarini, 56 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1705 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
66 US Authorities, supra note 17.
67 15 U.S.C. ß 1125(d) (1998 & Supp. 2003); 113 Stat. 1501, 1537 (1999). Congress
enacted the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act to deter the increasing practice
of cybersquatting. Virtual Works, Inc., 238 F.3d at 267.
68 Elecs. Boutique Holdings Corp., 56 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) at 1710-11.
69 Id. at 1713.
70 Am. Online, Inc. v. AT & T Corp., 243 F.3d 812, 814, 823 (4th Cir. 2001).
71 See, e.g., Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (holding that Amazon.com was not entitled to injunctive relief because
barnesandnoble.com had raised a substantial challenge to the validity of their ì1-clickî
patent); GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2000) (reinstating
preliminary injunction prohibiting Disney from using confusingly similar logo);
PlayMedia Sys., Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (enjoining
America Online because its use of software exceeded the license agreement).
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were rarely assessed.72 Rather, defendants such as spammers
and online pornographers accounted for most of the punitive
damages awards in business tort cases.73 In cyberspace, the
ìrepeat playersî such as America Online and other large Fortune
500 companies have the economic and legal resources needed to
successfully litigate punitive damages lawsuits.74
No straightforward enforcement mechanism exists for
enforcing tort judgments against web site providers who have no
physical presence within the United States.
Cyberspace
judgments are only enforceable if the defendant has assets
subject to legal process in the plaintiffís forum state. American
courts require the plaintiff to prove minimum contacts sufficient
to satisfy due process over a nonresident defendant.75 Courts
have declined jurisdiction in many Internet-related cases, ruling
that a passive web site alone is an insufficient basis for
jurisdiction.76 For a court to exercise jurisdiction, the defendant
72 See, e.g., PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 108 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2000);
Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D.
Va. 1998).
73 See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Natíl Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890
(N.D. Iowa 2001) (imposing punitive damages for sending spam e-mail on dental and
optical plans); Mattel Inc. v. Internet Dimensions Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1620
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (enjoining pornographerís use of the phrase ìBarbieís play penî on its
adult entertainment web site on the grounds that it diluted Mattelís trademark ìBarbieî
for dolls); Hollywood Entmít Corp. v. Hollywood Entmít, Inc., No. C 98-3670, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6466 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 1999) (entering default judgment in favor of family
video rental store against pornographic video rental store using identical trademark);
Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Internet Entmít Group, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (E.D. Mo.
1999) (enjoining use of PapalVisit.com domain name by adult entertainment web site
because it tarnished the Catholic Churchís trademark); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money Pie
Inc., 47 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1020 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (enjoining defendants from using its
trade name and service marks in spam e-mail); Hasbro Inc. v. Internet Entmít Group,
Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1479 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (enjoining pornographerís misuse of
CANDYLAND trademark in domain name).
74 Marc Galanter, Why the ìHavesî Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOCíY REV. 95, 97-114 (1974).
75 A threshold issue in many Internet cases is whether an out of state defendant may
be subject to process in the forum. The inquiry frequently focuses on whether the
defendantís web site activities are interactive or passive:
The great majority of these cases have adopted the analytical framework of
Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124
(W.D. Pa. 1997). In Zippo ñ also a case of specific jurisdiction ñ the court
examined the few cases that had previously addressed the issue of whether a
Web site could provide sufficient contacts for specific personal jurisdiction. It
applied the results of these cases to the traditional personal jurisdiction
analytical framework, noting that ìthe likelihood that personal jurisdiction can
be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality
of the commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet.î
Lakin v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 710 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming the district
courtís finding that the plaintiff had not proven minimum contacts to satisfy due process,
but reversing on the issue of general jurisdiction ordering additional discovery).
76 See generally MICHAEL RUSTAD & CYRUS DAFTARY, E-BUSINESS LEGAL HANDBOOK
ß 7.03 (2003 ed.).
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must have sufficient ìminimum contactsî such that they have
ìpurposefully availedî themselves of the privilege of doing
business in the forum.77 The issue of purposeful availment turns
on factual circumstances such as whether the web site targeted
residents in the plaintiffís jurisdiction.78
4.

Punitive Damages Are Awarded In Internet Economy
Strongholds

Table Four

Jurisdiction for Punitive Damages Awards
1992-2002
N=49
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Punitive damages in cyberspace between 1992-2002 were
handed down in only a handful of states. The state of California
accounted for approximately one in three punitive damages
awards (N=16, 33%). Texas ranked second with 9 of the 49
77 See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N the Water Publíg, 327 F.3d 472, 480-84
(6th Cir. 2003) (reversing district courtís purposeful availment determination as to record
company), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 399 (2003); Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc.,
282 F.3d 883, 890 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the purposeful availment requirement is
satisfied ìif the website is interactive to a degree that reveals [that the defendant]
specifically intended interaction with residents of the stateî); Biometics, LLC v. New
Womyn, 112 F. Supp. 2d 869, 872-73 (E.D. Mo. 2000) (selling products on web site to state
residents constituted purposeful availment).
78 The leading case in this area is Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,
which developed a continuum where the middle ground is the borderline between passive
and active web sites. 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
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punitive damages awards (18%) followed by Virginia with four
(8%) and Georgia and Illinois with three each. These five states
were the only jurisdictions that handed down three or more
punitive damages awards in Internet-related cases during that
ten-year period.79 Seventy-one percent of punitive damages in
cyberspace cases were awarded in these five jurisdictions (N=35).
Only twelve other states had one or more punitive damages
awards during a decade of Internet-related litigation in all
federal and state courts.80
Table Four documents that punitive damages coalesced in
the epicenters of the Internet economy and were correlated with
the location of key Internet companies. Table Four also confirms
that the cyber-jurisdictional hot spots roughly correspond to
centers of the Internet economy. A disproportionate number of
punitive damages awards were made in states with powerful
computer-based, entertainment or software industries. Two
information-age leaders, California and Texas, accounted for
greater than half of the punitive damages awards handed down
in the decade 1992-2002. In many of these cases the plaintiff was
a Texas or California corporation seeking redress against domain
name entrepreneurs, cyberpirates, or online business
competitors.
The greater incidence of punitive damages may be partially
explained by the prominence of these states in the information
economy. Californiaís robust pattern of litigation is due to the
dominance of the entertainment, high technology, and software
industries. Similarly, Texas is rapidly becoming an epicenter of
the computer software industry. Another notable mention is the
Northern District of Virginia, where a flurry of anti-spam cases
filed by America Online accounts for almost all of Virginiaís
punitive damages caseload in the decade studied. As we shall
see, the empirical evidence suggests that punitive damages
served primarily as a corporate means of legal control to protect
the information industries in these states from spammers,
cyberpirates, infringers, and other Internet wrongdoers.

79 In the larger study of torts in cyberspace, seventy percent of the cybertorts were
decided in only five states: California (33%, N=38), Illinois (4%, N=5), New York (6%,
N=7), Texas (13%, N=15) and Virginia (13%, N=15). See infra Appendix A.
80 Professor Saks, University of Iowa, concludes that no reliable data exists on
plaintiff wins or even the size of awards over time in traditional tort litigation. Michael J.
Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System ñ
And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1154 (1992).
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Punitive Damages Act as a Form of Corporate Self-Help

Table Five

Industry of Prevailing Plaintiff
N=49
Other
6%
Brick and Mortar
14%
Individual
45%

Inf ormation Industry
35%

a. Corporate Dominance in Cyberspace
Forty-nine percent of the cyberlaw punitive damages awards
were assessed in favor of companies classifiable as either
predominately a brick-and-mortar company or one in the
information industry.81 A content analysis of the cases in these
industries confirms that corporate America is a major beneficiary
of the punitive damages sword. Companies in all industries
outnumber individual plaintiffs and many of the disputes involve
powerful Internet stakeholders vindicating their rights in
81 The largest component of the ìinformation industryî is made up of ISPs, online
service providers, and telecommunication providers, which together account for 15% of all
cases. Computer software companies, such as Microsoft, Adobe, Intel, and the larger ISPs
were the big winners in cyberspace. Internet-based companies with a bricks-and-mortar
presence constituted the single largest plaintiff class among the non-individual plaintiffs.
ISPs accounted for the next largest plaintiff category industry, followed by other online
sales and services. Miscellaneous organizations accounted for only two punitive damages
awards. The information industry plaintiffs included companies that predominately
involved the transfer of intangible products such as software, entertainment content, and
other intangibles. ISPs such as America Online and Earthlink constituted one of the
largest sectors of the information industry in the sample. Other organizations included
non-profits. The research universe did not include governmental organizations as
prevailing plaintiffs.
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cyberspace.82 The individual plaintiffs depicted in Table Five
prevailed in cases arising out of non-consumer claims.83
Stockholders, investors, or employees received punitive damages
in only three of the forty-nine (6%) Internet-related cases
involving securities fraud or the failure to pay stock options.84
The residual ìotherî category included a few nonprofit
organizations.85 The next subsection examines the functions of
punitive damages for corporate plaintiffs in business-to-business
transactions.
b.

Corporate Self-Help Remedy in Cyberspace

i. Protecting Trade Secrets in Cyberspace
In the Internet economy, the crown jewels of a company may
be confidential information such as source code or methods of
doing business online.
Accordingly, companies have used
punitive damages as a tool to redress the misappropriation of
trade secrets. Trade secrets on the Internet may be lost at the
82 See, e.g., EarthLink, Inc. v. Smith, 13 Internet L. & Reg. (P&F) 94, (N.D. Ga. July
9, 2002) (awarding punitive damages against spammer in favor of large ISP); Am. Online,
Inc. v. Natíl Health Care Disc., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 890 (N.D. Iowa 2001) (awarding
punitive damages to AOL); Schmerin v. CD Titles, Inc., No. SUCV95-07061, 1998 WL
1754045 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 30, 1998) (awarding punitive damages to business
against small web site). See also Nguyen, supra note 39, at 977 (noting the award of
punitive damages in a business tort dispute over domain name between E-cards.com and
ECards.com); Neon Systems Says It Won $39 Million Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2001, at
C4 (punitive damages awarded in business torts case).
83 Non-consumer cases frequently arose out of the employment relationship. See,
e.g., Butler v. Krebs, No. 96-1204096, 1998 WL 2023763 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June 8, 1998)
(awarding punitive damages against airline and co-workers for superimposing nude
image of female pilot on web site and intranet among other acts of online harassment);
Franza v. Hayes, No. 802402, 2001 WL 1137243 (Ga. Fulton County Ct. May, 2001)
(awarding punitive damages to employee in workplace case).
84 There were a few Internet-related securities fraud cases in which punitive
damages were awarded for new dot-com businesses that allegedly defrauded investors. In
one case, investors were awarded $250,000 in punitive damages when directors of an
educational web site misrepresented that its stock would be registered and that the
investors would receive stock in another web site company. Chee v. PinkMonkey.com,
Inc., No. 00-38766, 2002 WL 1919479 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June 11, 2002).
85 The research sample excludes actions by the Federal Trade Commission (ìFTCî),
Securities & Exchange Commission, and other government agencies prosecuting actions
against cyberspace defendants. The sample includes cases where an individual or
corporate entity files suits against a government agency as a wrongdoer. Civil penalties
filed by the FTC in cyberspace cases are increasing rapidly. The cases in the FTC sample
disproportionately included defendants advertising miracle health products, get rich
business schemes, false credit repair schemes, deceptive investment opportunities,
pyramid schemes, deceptive adult entertainment sites, spam e-mailers, and other
marginal businesses. In recent years, FTC enforcers are expanding their enforcement
sweeps to include mainstream companies. Gateway.net, for example, was fined for
advertising free Internet services without the disclosure that long distance charges were
not free. The FTC is also expected to expand its enforcement against web sites
surreptitiously collecting consumer personal information. Gateway Settles FTC Charges
Over Free Internet Service Claims, at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/05/gateway.htm (May
15, 2001).
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click of the mouse and must be protected by measures to guard
the secrecy of information transmitted. Some of the first
cyberlaw
cases
involved
litigation
to
vindicate
the
misappropriation of trade secrets. The first online trade secrets
cases arose out of the Church of Scientologyís attempt to enjoin
further distribution of church doctrine on web sites.86 In one
case, the Church of Scientology filed suit against the Washington
Post for publishing portions of Scientology doctrine entitled
ìAdvanced Technology,î which were claimed as trade secrets.87
The federal district court denied injunctive relief finding that the
defendantsí actions were protected by the fair use doctrine of
federal copyright law and that the disputed documents were no
longer a trade secret as they had already been posted on the
Internet.88
Trade secrets in the online world deserve the same
protections as in the bricks-and-mortar world. Internet trade
secrets are particularly vulnerable because the interconnected
system of computers makes it possible for hackers, ex-employees,
and experts in corporate espionage to steal information without
leaving physical evidence. The Internet economy is known for a
rapid turnover in employees, and online companies face the
constant danger that an ex-employee will misappropriate trade
secrets for use in a competitorís business.
For example,
Monster.com recently settled a trade secret lawsuit against its
former president and eighteen ex-employees who left the
company to join a rival Internet company.89
The misappropriation of trade secrets is a popular cause of
action to protect the intangible assets of companies connected to
the Internet.90 In DoubleClick, Inc. v. Henderson,91 several
employees of a prominent Internet advertising company planned
to leave in order to form a dot-com startup.92 DoubleClick
86 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Communication Servs., Inc., 907
F. Supp. 1361, 1365-66 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (refusing to enjoin bulletin board service which
posted church documents); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 908 F. Supp. 1362, 1369 (E.D.
Va. 1995) (granting defendantís motion for summary judgment because there was no
trade secret misappropriation ).
87 Lerma, 908 F. Supp. at 1364-65.
88 Id. at 1367-68. See also Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.NET, Inc., 901 F. Supp.
1519 (D. Colo. 1995) (denying preliminary injunction where balance of harms weighed
against the plaintiff in case involving Church doctrine allegedly protected as trade
secrets).
89 Monster.com Ends Suit on Ex-Workers, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2001, at C7.
90 See, e.g., SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (enjoining use of
plaintiffís domain name as trademark infringement and enjoining meta tagging of
plaintiffís trademarks as unfair competition), affíd sub nom., Silva v. Karlson, 259 F.3d
717 (3d Cir. 2001).
91 No. 116914/97, 1997 WL 731413 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 1997).
92 Id. at *3.
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confiscated one of the employeeís laptops and found information
on the hard drive, including e-mails and future business plans
that provided evidence suggesting the misappropriation of trade
secrets.93
Punitive damages are increasingly used as a corporate tool to
punish and deter competitors that misappropriate trade
secrets.94 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act95 (ìUTSAî) provides a
wide array of remedies for trade secret misappropriation,
including preliminary injunctive relief, monetary damages, lost
profits, consequential damages, lost royalties, and attorneysí
fees.96 Section 3 of UTSA also gives the court the power to award
ìexemplary damages in an amount not exceeding twice any
award.î97
In October 2003, the Internet Truckstop, a web site devoted
to improving efficiencies in freight services,98 received a $120,000
punitive damages award against a competitor, Getloaded.com for
the theft of trade secrets.99 The judge imposed punitive damages
after the jury found Getloaded.com liable for hacking into
Internet Truckstopís computer system and misappropriating
computer codes and other trade secrets.100
In yet another case, a California court imposed $2.25 million
in punitive damages and $4.3 million in compensatory damages
against a Seattle firm for misappropriating an Internet
companyís technology for pop-up ads.101 The defendants, who
were in the business of selling cameras, used the plaintiffís popup technology to feature ìcameras trained on scantily clad
women.î102 The plaintiffs charged the defendant with failing to
pay online advertising revenues and with misappropriating client
lists that were used to start the defendantís own company.103
Id.
See, e.g., Bob Mims, Overstock.com Sues Two Former Employees, SALT LAKE TRIB.,
Dec. 9, 2003, at E9 (reporting that an Internet closeout retailer filed a trade secret claim
seeking punitive damages against former employees who allegedly sold customersí e-mail
addresses to spammer).
95 THE NATíL CONFERENCE OF COMMíRS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIF. TRADE SECRETS
ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS ßß 3-4 (1985).
96 Id. at ß 3.
97 Id.
98 The services offered by the Internet Truckstop included freight matching and its
corporate goal is to ìë[f]ill empty trailers.íî John D. Schulz, Attacking Inefficiencies,
TRAFFIC WORLD, Sept. 18, 2000, at 33 (quoting Internet Truckstop executive, Scott
Moscrip).
99 Trucking Site Appeals $510K Verdict, $120K in Punitives in CFAA Case, 16
SOFTWARE L. BULL. 3 (Oct. 2003).
100 Id.
101 Claire Luna, Court Victory for Firm Run by 3 Brothers, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003
(Orange County ed.), at B3.
102 Id.
103 Id.
93
94
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In general, large, established companies prevail in cybertort
cases against smaller rivals, startups, or web sites. Punitive
damages have been imposed in questionable business torts cases
where the evidence of aggravated circumstances was weak or
non-existent. The typical domain name dispute is a control
struggle between an established trademark owner and an
Internet entrepreneur who has registered a domain name
containing the same trademark.
ii. Punitive Damages and Domain Name Warfare
Domain name disputes typically arise when the registrant,
in an effort to attract Internet users, obtains the right to use a
domain name that is substantially similar or identical to the
trademarks or the name of a famous company or person. The
impact on the trademark ownerís business may be dramatic
because of the confusion created by a misleading domain name
address.
In Kremen v. Cohen,104 ex-convict Stephen Cohen forged a
letter to a domain name registrar, Network Solutions, claiming it
was a letter he received from Online Classifieds.105 The forged
letter tricked the registrar into assigning Kremenís rights to the
domain name, sex.com, to Cohen.106 Cohenís letter ìclaimed the
company had been ëforced to dismiss Mr. Kremen,í but ënever got
around to changing our administrative contact with the internet
registration [sic] and now our Board of directors has decided to
abandon the domain name sex.com.íî107 Judge Alex Kozinski
observed:
Despite the letterís transparent claim that a company called
ìOnline Classifiedsî had no Internet connection, Network
Solutions made no effort to contact Kremen. Instead, it
accepted the letter at face value and transferred the domain
name to Cohen. When Kremen contacted Network Solutions
some time later, he was told it was too late to undo the
transfer. Cohen went on to turn sex.com into a lucrative online
porn empire.108

Kremen filed a lawsuit against the perpetrator of the fraud
as well as an action for conversion against the registrar for
permitting the fraudulent transfer of sex.com.109 The district
court concluded that the letter had been forged, and accordingly,

104
105
106
107
108
109

337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1039.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1027.
337 F.3d at 1027-28.
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directed the defendant to return the domain name to Kremen.110
The court also invoked the constructive trust doctrine as well as
Californiaís unfair competition statute and ordered disgorgement
of the defendantís profits.111 The evidence was undisputed that
Cohen had forged the letter, whereby the owner, Kremen,
through his housemate, purportedly transferred the ìsex.comî
domain name.112 The district court, however, ruled that the
registrar was not liable since domain names could not be
converted.113 The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Network
Solutions could be held liable for conversion in transferring
Kremenís domain name to a con artist since Californiaís law of
conversion covers the theft of intangibles.114 However, the
defendant fled to Mexico, thumbing his nose at the court by
secreting his assets in offshore locations beyond the reach of
process.115
In Simon Property Group, L.P. v. mySimon, Inc.,116 Simon
Property Group (ìSPGî), a bricks-and-mortar company that
designed and managed shopping malls, brought suit against
mySimon, a dot-com company that had launched a web site in
October 1998.117 Six months after mySimonís launch, SPG
started ìa corporate ëbrandingí campaign to inform consumers
that it owned and managed certain shopping malls,î although it
had never considered such a campaign necessary in its 40 years
of existence.118 ìSPG demanded that mySimon stop using the
ëmySimoní name,î but the dot-com refused.119 SPG filed a
trademark infringement lawsuit under the Lanham Act as well
as business tort claims under Indiana state law.120
The gravamen of SPGís claim was that it had exclusive
rights to the ìSimonî name, and therefore, ìthat mySimonís
name, Web address, and cartoon mascot named ëSimoní infringed
on its rights.î121 The appeals court noted that SPG presented
weak evidence that the ìëSimoní name had attained secondary
Id. at 1027.
Id. The lower court ìawarded $40 million in compensatory damages and another
$25 million in punitive damagesî under Californiaís unfair competition statute. Id.
112 Kremen v. Cohen, No. C 98-20718, 2000 WL 1811403, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27,
2000).
113 337 F.3d at 1036 (affirming dismissal of plaintiffís conversion claim against
domain name registrar).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1027 (ìThe district court froze Cohenís assets, but Cohen ignored the order
and wired large sums of money to offshore accounts.î).
116 282 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 2002).
117 Id. at 987-88.
118 Id. at 988.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Simon Prop. Group, 282 F.3d at 988.
110
111

RUSTAD FINAL - MAY 28

63

5/28/2004 4:30 PM

Punitive Damages in Cyberspace

[Vol. 7:39

meaning or that consumers were likely to confuse SPG with
mySimon.î122 MySimon presented a highly probative consumer
survey ìdemonstrating that there was no likelihood of confusion
between mySimon and SPG.î123 Despite this compelling defense
to SPGís claim of trademark infringement, the jury handed down
an $11.5 million compensatory damages award against mySimon,
even though the record showed that mySimon had not yet earned
profits.124 The jury also awarded $5.3 million for corrective
advertising and $10 million in punitive damages.125 Finally, the
court permanently enjoined mySimon from using or
incorporating the terms ìSimonî or ìmy Simonî in any Internet
site and from using its ìSimonî cartoon mascot on its web site.126
However, the trial judge ìfound that requiring mySimon to
change its name provided sufficient relief,î and therefore,
reversed the $11.5 million damages award.127 The judge also
reduced the $10 million punitive damages award to $50,000 as
required by Indianaís tort reform statute.128 Finally, the judge
ìordered a new trial on the corrective advertising issue, subject to
SPGís acceptance of a remittitur to nominal damages of $10.î129
The Seventh Circuit dismissed SPGís appeal on the grounds that
the company had ìvoluntarily abandoned its quest for a
preliminary injunction after the district court denied its TRO
motion,î and because ì[t]he potential threat to SPGís name [was]
questionable.î130 In this case, the court apparently found that
the corporate plaintiff was ìpushing the envelopeî in using
punitive damages to protect its rights and defend its market
position.
iii. Protecting Corporate Reputations in
Cyberspace
Bitter disputes arise over the use of the Internet to impugn
the reputation of companies by posting allegedly false
information. In Amway Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co.,131 Amway
brought suit against Procter & Gamble (ìP & Gî) after a third
party published on the Internet a complaint P&G had filed in
another case. P & Gís posted complaint contained allegedly
defamatory statements about Amway, its officers, and its
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Id. at 988, 991.
Id. at 989.
Id.
Id.
Simon Prop. Group, 282 F.3d at 989.
Id.
Id. at 989-90.
Id.
Id. at 990-91.
346 F.3d 180 (6th Cir. 2003).
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business practices, asserting that Amway was operating as an
illegal pyramid scheme.132 The district court granted P & Gís
motion for summary judgment and found that Michiganís
Reporting Privilege protected the accurate posting of the publicly
available court documents.133 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal, finding that even if the statements in the original
document were defamatory, their publication on the Internet did
not constitute an additional act of libel on P & Gís part.134
Disputes between business competitors over Internet activities
may amount to legal warfare. The Sixth Circuit observed that
the ìhate-filled history between P & G and Amway would take a
writing as long as both the Old and New Testaments and involve
at least one of the Good Bookís more prominent players.î135
The Internet makes it easy to falsify return e-mail addresses,
allowing web site posters to defame corporate actors
anonymously.136 The corporate plaintiffs are sometimes forced to
subpoena ISPs in order to discover the identity of these John Doe
defendants.137 The use of John Doe subpoenas to unveil Internet
corporate critics creates a conflict between tort law and the rights
of free speech.
A California company and two of its executives filed a libel
and invasion of privacy-based lawsuit against two ex-employees
who posted a series of messages on an Internet bulletin board
devoted to the companyís publicly traded stock.138 The offending
ìmessages maligned the companyís products and suggested that
the two executives were incompetent and dishonest and that one
of them, a woman, might have obtained her position by having
sex with a supervisor.î139 A California jury found the exemployees liable for invasion of privacy, libel, breach of contract,
and conspiracy, and awarded $425,000 in general damages and
Id. at 181.
Id. at 187.
Id.
Id. at 182 (internal footnote omitted).
Trade libel is similar to an ordinary defamation case in that a defendant has
published a false and derogatory statement about a company. Vondran v. McLinn, No. C
95-20296, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21974, at *14 (N.D. Cal. July 5, 1995). The test for
business defamation is ìëwhether, in the circumstances, the writing discredits the plaintiff
in the minds of any considerable and respectable class of the community.íî Smith v.
Suburban Rests., Inc., 373 N.E.2d 215, 217 (Mass. 1978) (quoting Muchnick v. Post Publíg
Co., 125 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Mass. 1955)).
137 See Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001)
(involving a corporation seeking to force America Online to reveal the identities of
anonymous web posters).
138 Varian Wins $775,000 Jury Verdict in Internet Libel Case, at http://www.orrick.
com/news_events/releases.asp?action=article&articleID=56 (Dec. 18, 2001).
139 David Watson, C.A.: Defamatory Internet Posting Libel, Not Slander,
METROPOLITAN NEWS-ENTERPRISE (Los Angeles), Nov. 14, 2003, at 1.
132
133
134
135
136
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$350,000 in punitive damages.140 The trial judge enjoined the
defendants from posting additional defamatory information.141 It
is becoming clear that corporations are using punitive damages
as a form of self-help to protect their intellectual property and
intangible assets, and to punish trade libel.
6. Punitive Damages Are Assessed Against Corporate Mice
Not Elephants
Table Six

Punitive Damages by Defendant Type
N=49
Other Organization
6%

Indiv idual

N at'l/Internat'l C o.

20%

16%

Medium Corporation
10%

Sm all C orp/W ebsite
47%

a.

Small Companies Comprise the Largest Category of
Cybertort Defendants
Table Six suggests that small companies are more likely to
be defendants in cyberspace tort cases than large or medium
corporations.142 A total of 47% (N=23) of the punitive damages
Id.
Id.
Punitive damages were rarely awarded in favor of small companies against large
companies. Of the awards handed down against large corporate defendants, individuals
won five of these cases. Two of three were won by a medium sized company and only one
punitive damages award was in favor of a small company against a large company. In
contrast, seven out of eight punitive damages awards won by large companies (defined as
companies with a Fortune 500 presence or nationally known brand) were awarded against
small corporate web sites or startup companies.
140
141
142
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defendants were either small online companies or web sites.
Medium-sized companies were defendants in only five cyberlaw
cases in which punitive damages were awarded. Of the five
cases, three awards were in favor of employees of that
corporation. Of the remaining two awards assessed against
medium-sized companies, one award was to another mediumsized company and the other to a national company. No small
company prevailed against a medium-sized company in a decade
of cyberlaw cases. The pattern suggests that small online
companies are frequently targeted in punitive damages litigation.
Still, the overall numbers of punitive damages awards are low. It
is suprising that there would be less than fifty successful
punitive damages claims in a decade of Internet boom. It is quite
likely that there may be additional barriers to litigating in
cyberspace. Even powerful corporate actors such as America
Online or Microsoft may find it difficult to pursue elusive
defendants in cyberspace. The cases that did not result in
punitive damages or that were never even brought because of
barriers to litigating in cyberspace are the really interesting
aspects implied by Table Six.
The Internet allows anonymous communications that are
virtually impossible to trace through Internet nodes. Cybertortfeasors frequently use false e-mail headers and anonymous
remailers to make it difficult to retrace the steps of wrongdoing.
Computer records are easy to alter and it is likely that spoliation
of electronic evidence is widespread. Internet fraud is frequently
launched from an offshore haven. For instance, the large
numbers of Nigerian bank fraud schemes are hard to control
because the perpetuators are located in West Africa.143
b. Punitive Justice Against Infringing Mice
The metaphor of Internet ìelephantsî and ìmiceî developed
by Peter Swire is helpful in understanding the large number of
cyberlaw wrongdoers who escape punitive justice.144 Professor
143 Lagos and Lome-Togo, Nigeria are the places of origin for most Nigerian Letter
Scams. Nigerian Letter Scams, Internet Fraud Complaint Center, at http://www.ifccfbi.
gov/strategy/nls.asp (last visited Jan. 20, 2004). Congo-Zaire, Sadton, Cote d Ivoire, Accra
Ghana, Eleme, Festac Town, Ivory Coast, and Sierra-Leone are other African cities where
these scams have developed. Id. Interestingly, ìCanada and the United Kingdom have
[also] been identified as originating countries for this scam.î Id. Given these diverse
locations, it will be expensive to obtain redress for the loss of funds, even if the ìdot
consterî is identified.
144 Peter P. Swire, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy: International Choice of Law and
the Internet, 32 INTíL LAW 991, 993, 1019-23 (1998) (arguing that large multi-national
corporations are elephants easy to regulate on the Internet because they frequently have
assets that can be attached, versus ìmice,î who are small, mobile actors that can easily
elude enforcement because they have the capacity to disappear or hide in an off-shore
haven).
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Swire defines corporate ìelephantsî as ìlarge organizations that
have major operations in a country. Elephants are powerful and
have a thick skin, but are impossible to hide. They are
undoubtedly subject to a countryís jurisdiction.î145 In other
words, when a corporate elephant such as a national corporation
commits wrongs in cyberspace, there will frequently be assets to
attach and officers to receive process. For example, companies
like AOL, Amazon.com, eBay, and Yahoo! are classified as
ìelephantsî because they are subject to regulation everywhere.
On the other hand, ìmiceî are the exact opposite.146
Even when a prevailing plaintiff wins a large punitive
damages award, collecting it is a different matter. Collecting a
punitive damages award is difficult because a number of wily
Internet mice either fail to make an appearance, file bankruptcy,
or simply disappear after the plaintiff obtains a judgment.147
Default judgments outnumbered cases decided by juries in the
larger cybertort dataset. The plaintiffs in cases against Internet
mice have almost no chance of collecting their judgment.148 In
John Does v. Franco Productions,149 forty-six young men were
awarded $506 million against Franco Productions and Internet
Distributors for compensatory and punitive damages in a case in
which the defendants secretly filmed college athletes and sold the
The defendants secretly
videotapes on the Internet.150
videotaped college athletes in locker rooms, restrooms, and
showers.151 The tapes carried names like ìStraight Off the Matî
and ìVoyeur Time,î and depicted hundreds of young athletes who
had unknowingly been photographed in various degrees of
nudity.152 However, since the primary defendant was likely
offshore, and thus failed to make an appearance to defend the
action, this multi-million dollar award is largely symbolic.

Id. at 993.
Id.
See, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 656 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that online
pornographer defaulted in a case filed by college athletes for secret filming and sale of
videos online); Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003) (reporting that
primary defendant moved assets to an off-shore haven and defaulted); Caton v. Trudeau,
157 F.3d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1998) (reporting that defendant filed bankruptcy after
Internet libel judgment was rendered).
148 See, e.g., GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 656-57 (observing that there was little chance in
recovering $500 million award against defaulting primary defendant in decision
dismissing claim against GTE for enabling sale of unauthorized tapes by defendant).
149 No. 99 C 7885, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24032 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2002), affíd sub
nom., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
150 Id. at *1; Does v. Franco Prods., No. 99 C 7885, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9848, at *2
(N.D. Ill. July 12, 2000).
151 Franco Prods., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *2.
152 Jere Longman, Videotaped Athletes Victorious in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2002,
at D8.
145
146
147
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An Internet company ìcan reopen immediately after being
kicked off of a server or can move offshore.î153 As Professor Swire
notes, ìMice breed annoyingly quicklyónew sites can open at
any time.î154 When ìharm over the Internet is caused by mice,
hidden in crannies in the network, traditional legal enforcement
is more difficult.î155 The large number of default judgments in
cyberlaw reflects the reality that it is easy for web sites to
disappear or assets to be transferred. The next subsection
illustrates how large corporate actors (ìelephantsî) are in a
better position to litigate against elusive web site wrongdoers
(ìmiceî) than are consumers.
In the cyberlaw sample, corporate elephants were seldom
defendants in punitive damages litigation. From the beginning
of cyberlitigation, it has been the large corporate elephants that
have prevailed in lawsuits against mice.
In the field of
intellectual property law, it is the owners of famous trademarks
and trade names who frequently file lawsuits against small
companies. Playboy Enterprises, for example, has the legal
resources to file intellectual property lawsuits to protect its
trademarks and copyrighted images in cyberspace.156 Internet
elephants frequently enjoy advantages as repeat players in
cyberlitigation. In many cases, only the corporate elephants have
the legal resources to vindicate their rights. Again, Playboy
Enterprises is a good example of a major cyberlitigator who
frequently files lawsuits to protect its corporate name and
intellectual property rights. Frequently, the corporate elephant
is litigating against smaller companies, some of which are located
in foreign venues.157
Swire, supra note 144, at 993.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d
1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (denying Playboyís motion for a preliminary injunction against
Netscape for using Playboyís Internet-related trademarks in keywords of search engine),
affíd, 202 F.3d 278 (9th Cir. 1999); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Universal Tel-A-Talk, Inc., 48
U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1779 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that plaintiff failed to allege necessary
facts for a trademark counterfeiting claim).
157 See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting
Playboyís arguments that former playmate who used the phrase ìPlaymate of the Yearî
on her web site and in metatags violated trademark law); Playboy Enters., Inc. v.
Sanfilippo, 46 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1350 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (awarding damages to Playboy
based upon the web siteís unauthorized copying of Playboyís copyrighted images); Playboy
Enters., Inc. v. AsiaFocus Intíl, Inc., No. 97-734-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10359 (E.D. Va.
Feb. 2, 1998) (reporting copyright infringement action versus small foreign company);
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (awarding
damages to Playboy based upon the web siteís unauthorized copying of Playboyís
copyrighted images), affíd, 168 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 1999); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Russ
Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (finding bulletin board liable for
direct and contributory infringement for posting Playboyís copyrighted and trademarked
images for access by paying subscribers); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp.
153
154
155
156
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The overall problem that there are too few punitive damages
awards in cyberspace appears to be due to the huge costs
involved in tracking down anonymous wrongdoers. It is likely
that few consumers have the technical expertise to determine
who is tracking their click-streams, unleashing viruses, or
sending fraudulent offers.
The small number of punitive
damages cases may be partially explained by the fact that
defendants may be mice who are difficult to trace. In traditional
torts, it is generally not a problem to determine the identity of a
wrongdoer. In contrast, cyber-tortfeasors are not physically
present at the scene of the misdeed. Computers can be the target
of a tortious act, such as when information is misappropriated
from a database or a computer network. Furthermore, a network
or web site may be the target of viruses or vandalism that
constitutes a property tort.
Owners of famous trademarks such as Playboy, Mattel,
Victoriaís Secret, and America Online have been successful
litigants in cyberspace because of their superior legal resources.
These companies have used the courts to not only vindicate their
traditional rights against Internet mice but also to expand
intellectual property protections in this new medium.158 In many
cases, large national enterprises were filing lawsuits against
companies that existed only in cyberspace.
In Playboy
Enterprises, Inc. v. Webbworld, Inc.,159 for example, a web site
was found liable for copyright infringement for offering a
subscription service to adult images protected by copyright.160
Mice, on the other hand, have far more flexibility and can
disappear at the click of a mouse or seek an offshore haven. The
anonymity of individual Internet users makes it easy to commit
civil wrongs without consequence. Enforcement by individuals is
frustrated by the ease with which individual users may simply
disappear from cyberspace.
Individuals subject to various
cyberspace laws or controls may simply ìëexití from the regime
defined by those laws.î161
1552, (M.D. Fla. 1993) (finding that a small companyís web site infringed Playboyís
trademarks and copyrights in posting images to its site).
158 The typical complaint by a trademark owner against the owner of a domain name
is litigated under diverse causes of action, including (1) trademark infringement, (2)
trademark dilution (federal and state), (3) domain name piracy, (4) false designation of
origin, and (5) unfair competition. Trademark owners frequently seek injunctive relief to
enjoin the use of the domain name or a transfer of the domain name. Courts may enjoin
commercial content on a domain nameís web sites but are reluctant to enjoin the use of
the domain name for noncommercial purposes.
159 991 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1997), affíd, 168 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 1999).
160 Id. at 548.
161 Elizabeth Longworth, The Possibilities for a Legal Framework for Cyberspace, in
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF CYBERSPACE LAW 16 (UNESCO Publíg 2000).
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An Italian designer, Alfredo Versace, for example, was
enjoined from marketing clothing and other items in the United
States because the federal court ruled that he was using
trademarks confusingly similar to trademarks registered by the
famous designer, Gianni Versace.162 Undeterred by the federal
court order, Alfredo simply used offshore Internet sites to
advertise and distribute his products in the United States.163
c. Anti-Spam Initiatives Against Online Mice
Punitive damages lawsuits against commercial e-mailers
accounted for approximately 10% of all awards. In every
punitive damages award, it was the ISP, rather than the
consumer, who won punitive damages, even though the injuries
were suffered primarily by consumers through spam e-mail. For
example, an unsolicited bulk e-mail health solicitation was sent
to millions of AOL subscribers stating: ìThe answer to cancer has
been know [sic] for years. This website proves that eating
inexpensive apple seeds and/or apricot seeds completely cure [sic]
most cancers. The theory also states that by eating just a few
seeds per day will [sic] 99.95% guarantee that you will never
develop cancer.î164 The commercial e-mail messages made claims
regarding their ìcancer curesî and typically directed recipients to
a web site where they could purchase products such as Laetrile, a
videotape, and a book promoting the defendantís cancer
treatment.165
In the vast majority of the cases, it is the ISP rather than the
consumer who seeks punitive damages and other relief against
the spammer. AOL, for example, ìhas undertaken various
technical efforts to permit its members to opt out of receiving
messages from domains and IP addresses that are or have been
the subject of member complaints regarding unsolicited bulk email.î166 However, the wily spammer continually develops new
methods for bypassing ISP controls. The spammer transmits email ìfrom multiple and varying domains, employ[s] random and
varying user names, relay[s] their messages through the servers
of innocent third parties, or falsif[ies] the headers on their emails to indicate that their messages are from domains that AOL

162 Gianni Versace, S.p.A. v. Versace, No. 01 Civ. 9645, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14858,
at *47-48 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2003).
163 Id. at *15-16.
164 Am. Online, Inc. v. Christian Bros., No. 98 CIV 8959, slip op. at 9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9,
1999) (quoting example of defendantís bulk e-mailing practices), available at
http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dljunk/christian.html.
165 Id. at 10.
166 Id. at 11.
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does not filter (e.g., ëmsn.comí or ëaol.comí).î167 Despite the best
efforts of the ISP community, computer systems are unable to
detect and filter much of the tidal wave of unsolicited bulk e-mail
targeting consumers.
This tidal wave of spam has greatly increased the costs
associated with running an ISP. For example, a director of one
ISP claimed ìthat [spam] [had] added 500 percent to 700 percent
to the ISPís costs over nearly three years.î168 Punitive damages
are increasingly being used by large ISPs in punishing and
deterring the widespread social problem of spam e-mail.
Amazon.com, for example, has recently filed lawsuits seeking
punitive damages against eleven e-mail marketers who spoofed
the companyís e-mail addresses.169 The e-mail forgeries were
ìpromoting, among other things, home appliances and penis
enlargement.î170
In one case, a California software manufacturer was sued for
deceptive business practices in a Washington class action.171 The
software vendor used deceptive Internet advertising banners that
impersonated computer error messages with ìheadings that read
ësecurity alert,í ëwarningí and ëmessage alert,í with messages that
include[d]: íyou[r] computer is currently broadcasting an Internet
IP address. With this address, someone can immediately begin
Internet users receiving this
attacking your computer.íî172
message were urged to click ìOKî to the message.173 Allegedly,
ìviewers who click an ëOKí button [were] forwarded to a
commercial Web site promoting Bonzi software for preventing
Internet intrusions or speeding up Internet connections.î174 The
lawsuit, filed on behalf of consumers in eight states, was settled
when the company agreed to label its ìsecurity alertî as an
advertisement.175
In a typical day, the average consumer has an e-mail inbox
full of offers to make fast money. ISPs such as America Online
seek to enjoin these unsolicited advertisements to their millions
Id.
Drew Clark, E-Commerce: Internet Firms Share Horror Stories About Costs of
Spam, NATíL J. TECH. DAILY, May 1, 2003, at LEXIS, Nexis Library NATíL J. TECH. DAILY
File.
169 Matthew Heller, Lost in the Cyber-Kudzu, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003 (Magazine),
at 24.
170 Id.
171 Software Manufacturer Accused of Using Deceptive Internet Ad Banners, MEALEYíS
LITIG. REP.: CLASS ACTIONS, Dec. 19, 2002, at 4.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Error Copycat Pop-up Will Be Labeled as Ad, CAP. TIMES (Madison, Wis.), May 29,
2003, at 6E.
167
168
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of subscribers by arguing that these unwanted messages trespass
upon their personal property. Consequently, ISPs such as
America Online were the first to employ punitive damages as an
anti-spam remedy.176 A large service provider such as AOL
suffers damages due to spammersí use of false return addresses.
In responding to subscriber complaints regarding spam e-mail,
AOL incurs costs in wasted bandwidth, traffic slowdowns, decline
in user productivity, and time.177
America Online employs punitive damages to punish those
who flood their subscribers with unwanted e-mail. In America
Online, Inc. v. National Health Care Discount, Inc.,178 the court
found that the spammerís e-mail actions constituted a trespass to
chattels as well as a violation of state and federal computer
abuse laws.179 The court calculated damages by charging the
spammer $2.50 per thousand pieces of spam for a total of
$337,500.180
In yet another case, America Online, Inc. v. Prime Data
Systems, Inc.,181 the court entered a default judgment granting a
permanent injunction and awarding compensatory and punitive
damages.182 The court found that the mass e-mailerís conduct
warranted the ìimposition of punitive damages both to punish
defendantsí conduct and to deter othersí tortious behavior that
threatens the vitality of Internet e-mail communication.î183 The
magistrate judge set the level of punitive damages at ìthree
times AOLís proven per-message cost of $.00078.î184 Thus,
punitive damages were assessed at a rate of $.00234 per
message.185 The court found that the punitive damages assessed
were consistent with treble damages authorized by state and
federal statutes for aggravated misconduct.186 However, the
Prime Data court was forced to reduce the punitive damages
award due to a 1988 tort reform statute that required judges to
reduce awards to the upper limit of $350,000.187

176 See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 549 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(awarding punitive damages against a spam e-mailer).
177 Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, No. 98-0011-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20448, at *3 (E.D.
Va. Nov. 20, 1998).
178 174 F. Supp. 2d 890 (N.D. Iowa 2001).
179 Id. at 900.
180 Id. at 901.
181 No. 97-1652-A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20226 (E.D. Va. Nov. 20, 1998).
182 Id. at *14-16.
183 Id. at *10.
184 Id. at *13.
185 Id.
186 Prime Data Systems, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20226, at *13-14.
187 Id. at *11 (citing VA. CODE ß 8.01-38.1).
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Fraudulent uses of unsolicited commercial e-mail victimize
millions of Internet users. Accordingly, ISPs have filed hundreds
of lawsuits seeking punitive damages to punish spammers, but
tort law is just beginning to accomplish this goal. Even a
corporate elephant such as America Online must muster
substantial resources to successfully litigate against elusive
spam e-mailers who engage in such deceptive practices as
falsified or redirected addresses.
Despite the havoc that spam creates for Internet consumers,
no individual plaintiff has ever won a victory against a spammer
outside of small claims court judgments. A Pennsylvania court
expressly ruled that the federal Telephone Consumer Protection
Act188 could not be used by consumers to punish and deter the
sending of solicited commercial e-mail.189
The CAN-SPAM Act of 2003190 that went into effect on
January 1, 2004 prohibits consumers and ISPs from filing
lawsuits against spam e-mailers under the federal statute.191
Section 7 of the CAN-SPAM Act provides for exclusive
enforcement by the FTC and certain other agencies, rather than
by ISPs or consumers.192 State attorneys general are not
permitted to file anti-spam lawsuits if there is a pending federal
civil or administrative enforcement action by the FTC.193
Furthermore, the new federal anti-spam statute preempts all
state anti-spam legislation, even those that provide consumers
with a cause of action against commercial e-mailers.194 A number
of states enacted anti-spam statutes that permitted consumers to
sue e-mail senders who used misleading subject lines,
transmission paths, or third-party domain names without
permission.195 In 2001 alone, anti-spam statutes were introduced
in twenty-six states, and each of these statutes is preempted by
CAN-SPAM.196 The nationalization of anti-spam legislation
further marginalizes the role of consumers in directly redressing
abuses due to unsolicited e-mail. In the end, commercial e47 U.S.C. ß 227 (2003).
Aronson v. Bright-Teeth Now, LLC, 824 A.2d 320, 320-21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003
(CAN-SPAM Act of 2003), Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat. 2699 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.).
191 See CAN-SPAM Act ß 7.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id. ß 8. Section 8 supersedes any state statute or regulation governing commercial
e-mail, but it does not address the use of tort remedies against spam. Id.
195 See, e.g., State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 407, 413 (Wash. 2001) (upholding state of
Washington anti-spam statute and rejecting defendantís argument that it unduly
burdened interstate commerce).
196 RUSTAD & DAFTARY, supra note 76, at ß 5.03[E].
188
189
190
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mailers will no longer be subject to consumer lawsuits under
state anti-spam statutes.
7. Punitive Damages Are Low-Ratio Awards Often Lower
Than Compensatory Damages
Table Seven

Ratios of Punitive Damages in Cyberspace
N=49
PDs More 3X CDs
12%

PDs less than CDs
PDs 1 to 3 Times CDs

53%

35%

In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell,197 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a $145 million
punitive damages award on the grounds of substantive due
process.198 The Court observed that ì[c]ompensatory damages
ëare intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has
suffered by reason of the defendantís wrongful conductíî whereas
ìpunitive damages . . . are aimed at deterrence and
retribution.î199 The Courtís constitutional analysis of punitive
damages requires the plaintiff to make a showing that the
defendantís misconduct is sufficiently reprehensible in order to
satisfy due process.200 The Courtís recent revisit of damage award
123 S. Ct. 1513 (2003).
Id. at 1519-21.
Id. at 1519 (quoting Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S.
424, 432 (2001)).
200 Id. at 1521. The Court has also noted that reprehensibility is higher where the
ìtarget of the conduct had financial vulnerability.î Id.
197
198
199
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ratios in Campbell should have little effect on cyberlaw punitive
awards. The Court held that a juryís award of punitive damages
of $145 million and compensatory damages of $1 million (145:1)
was unconstitutionally excessive.201 The Court came close to
stating a per se rule that extreme ratios are presumptively
unconstitutionally excessive.202 Punitive damages in cyberspace
are often much smaller in proportion to the compensatory
damages.
In 53% of the cyberlaw awards, the punitive
component of the verdict was actually less than the
compensatory damages.
In only six instances (12%) were
punitive damages three or more times greater than the
compensatory award.
Table Seven confirms that there is no problem with
skyrocketing punitive damages in cyberspace. The function of
punitive damages in the first decade of Internet litigation was
generally to assist companies in protecting their rights and
consolidating control of the Internet. The traditional role of
punitive damages in products liability, premises liability, medical
malpractice, and other substantive fields is to provide consumer
protection. In cyberspace, consumers were conspicuously missing
from the punitive damages equation. Courts have been reluctant
to impose legal duties on corporate defendants for inadequate
Internet security and for preventing third parties from
unleashing viruses, hacking, or stealing consumer information.
Furthermore, courts have yet to extend products liability
standards to computer software or web sites.

201
202

Id. at 1524.
Id.

RUSTAD FINAL - MAY 28

2004]

5/28/2004 4:30 PM

Chapman Law Review

76

8. Punitive Damages Were Rarely Appealed By Defendant
Table Eight

Judicial Review of Punitive Verdicts
N=49
Appeal Upheld
4%
Trial Ct. Modifies
8%
App. Court Modifies
12%

No Adjustment
76%

Table Eight reveals that relatively few judicial adjustments
were made to punitive damages in cyberspace cases. No appeal
or post-verdict adjustment occurred in thirty-seven of the fortynine cyberlaw punitive damages awards. One reason for so few
adjustments is that the ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages is generally proportional or lower. The median punitive
damages award was only 82% of the size of the compensatory
damages, with a mean award only 1.7 times the size of the
compensatory component.
Interestingly, defendants who actually challenged punitive
damages were frequently successful in getting a reversal or
remittal of the award. In the twelve cases where a judicial
modification occurred, the trial judge reduced or reversed the
punitive damages awards in four instances. Of the eight punitive
damages awards reviewed by appellate courts, six verdicts were
reduced or reversed. The small number of appeals can be
explained by the large number of default judgments in the
sample as well as the large number of low ratio awards discussed
above. For example, in many of the high profile punitive
damages cases, the primary defendant disappeared with a click
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of the mouse, and for several of the largest punitive damages
awards, the Internet mice disappeared or defaulted.203
In a few cases, punitive damages in favor of large corporate
actors were capped or limited by tort reforms that were originally
enacted to protect companies. The traditional critique of punitive
damages is that large corporations suffer at the hands of ìjackpot
juries.î204 The tort reform movement to limit punitive damages
arises from the perception that it is the corporations that are
victimized by greedy individual claimants and their lawyers. In
2003 alone, the corporate community convinced legislators in
seventeen states to file proposed statutes limiting punitive
damages as well as the doctrine of joint and several liability.205
One of the unanticipated consequences of tort reform is that
it may end up hurting its corporate advocates. The business
community in Texas, for example, viewed then governor George
W. Bush as ìthe right man to break the back of the litigious
culture in the Lone Star State.î206 As Governor of Texas, Bush
ìsigned seven major bills into law, including ones that capped
punitive damages at no more than twice actual damages plus
$750,000.î207 In his State of the Union address in January 2003,
President Bush noted the importance of enacting federal tort
reforms.208 However, legal backfire, or the law of unanticipated
consequences, posits ìthat a [new] law produces or will produce
results directly contrary to one or more of those intended. Legal
backfire claims are pervasive, yet potentially misleading and
harmful argumentation used primarily to undermine existing
law (or policy) or to forestall the enactment of new law.î209
Any new technology will frequently produce legal backfire
because social changes inevitably impact legal institutions in
entirely unpredictable ways. The legal backfire from tort reform
is that it impairs the corporate communityís ability to vindicate
its rights in cyberspace. Corporate tort reformers paint the
ìimage of a monstrously destructive civil justice systemî that is

203 See, e.g., Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003) (imposing liability for
conversion against domain name registrar in case in which primary defendant defaulted
in $65 million punitive damages award); Jere Longman, Videotaped Athletes Victorious in
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2002, at D8.
204 A search in LEXISís current news file produced 669 ìhitsî for the search ìjackpot
w/5 jury or juries.î
205 Mark Ballard, 17-Front Tort War, NATíL L.J., May 12, 2003, at 1.
206 Christopher OíLeary, Lone Star Litigation: Are Huge Jury Awards in Texas a
Relic?, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, May 2003, at 43, 46.
207 Id. at 48.
208 See Doctors and Tort Reform, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2003, at B6.
209 Robert A. Hillman, The Rhetoric of Legal Backfire, 43 B.C. L. REV. 819, 819
(2002).
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sapping American productivity and competitiveness.210 Many of
the tort reform arguments could be applied with more validity to
large corporate stakeholders using litigation to enclose the
Internet commons. ìNeo-conservatives often employ the theme of
a ëculture of victimization gone wildí to ridicule [individual]
plaintiffs seekingî redress for personal injury.211 The general
public is amused, angered, and perplexed by accounts of loony
tort filings publicized by tort reformers. However, many of the
widely disseminated tort stories are totally false or presented in
a misleading and pejorative fashion.212
The corporate opponents of punitive damages portray the
civil justice system ìas greedy vulture lawyers against poor
oppressed businesses.î213 Ironically, it appears that corporations
are actually using punitive damages as a tool to protect their
rights in cyberspace. In the tort reform debates, corporate
America is not seeking limitations on punitive damages in this
area. If punitive damages are evolving as a corporate sword
rather than as a shield in cyberspace, the tort reformers may
wish to revise their demands to eliminate or cripple the remedy.
Tort reform has played a role in capping punitive damages
sought by companies. In the Simon Property Group case
discussed earlier in this Article, the trial judge reduced a
punitive damages award for a state unfair competition claim
from $10 million to $50,000.214 As the court explained, ìIndiana
law limits punitive damages to the greater of $50,000 or three
times compensatory damages.î215 In a Virginia case, a federal
court awarded the plaintiff $675,000 including $350,000 in
punitive damages, that stateís upper.216 The Virginia cap of
$350,000 has also limited punitive damages awards to America
Online in their cases against spammers.217
Rustad & Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster, supra note 30, at 3.
Id.
THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 173 (2001).
For example, ì[t]ort reformers frequently cite the case of a woman who received
$2,699,000 in punitive damages after injuring her back opening a pickle jar.î Id.
However, in the actual case, the court justified the punitive damages based on the
defendantís conduct of nearly five years, including retaliation, which was found to be
ìëwillful, mean-spirited acts indicative of an intent to cause physical or emotional harm.íî
Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice
System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 730 (1998) (quoting Vandevender v. Sheetz, Inc., 490 S.E.2d
678, 693 (W. Va. 1997).
213 Christina Johns, Tort Reform, at http://www.cjjohns.com/c_law/tort_reform.html
(last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
214 Simon Prop. Group, L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 282 F.3d 986, 990 (7th Cir. 2002).
215 Id.
216 Graham v. Oppenheimer, No. 00CV57, 2000 WL 33232110 (E.D. Va. Oct. 2000);
Kathleen Fay, Defamed MD Awarded Maximum Punitive Damages Award in Va., E-COM.
L. & STRATEGY, Jan. 2001, at 12.
217 See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Bluecard Publíg, No. 98-905-A, slip op. at 9-10 (E.D.
210
211
212
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Cyberspace punitive damages flip the historic role of
punitive damages in which individuals normally filed suit
against powerful companies. The typical plaintiff in Internet
punitive litigation is a large corporation suing a defendant in the
dark side of the Net.
Internet defendants are typically
cybersquatters, online pornographers, spammers, or anonymous
critics located in an offshore haven.
Few legislators who supported tort reform could have
anticipated that one consequence was to handcuff informationindustry leaders such as America Online, eBay, and Amazon.com
in punishing and deterring spammers and other Internet
predators. Lord Devlin approved a large punitive damages
award in an aggravated assault case observing that one should
think of punitive damages as ìa fine which has to hit the
defendant hard if he has disregarded the rights of others and
show that that sort of conduct does not pay.î218 Punitive
damages ìshould reflect ëthe enormity of [the defendantís]
offenseíî rather than some arbitrary ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages.219 The deterrent power of punitive
damages is significantly eroded when Internet wrongdoers can
compute the cost of wrongdoing in advance.
The next part of this Article explains why punitive damages
have yet to develop in cyberspace and why they are necessary to
fortify existing consumer protection in cyberspace.
II. EXTENDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO INTERNET
CONSUMERS
Internet-related consumer fraud complaints skyrocketed
from 49,957 to 75,063 from 2001 to 2002.220 Forty-six percent of
the Internet fraud complaints were for losses from online auction
fraud with a median loss of $320.221 The non-delivery of goods
accounted for just under a third of complaints with a median loss
of $176.222 Consumer confidence in cyberspace is impaired by
worries about the lack of information security, data protection,
confidentiality, and the failure of web merchants to deliver goods
and services in a timely manner.223 The Internet is a borderless
Va. Jan. 5, 2000) (reducing punitive damages in cases involving numerous deceptive
practices
of
the
spammers
to
mask
their
identity),
available
at
http://legal.web.aol.com/decisions/dljunk/bluecard.html.
218 Loudon v. Ryder, [1953] 2 Q.B. 202, 209 (1953).
219 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
220 IFCC 2002 INTERNET FRAUD REPORT, supra note 16, at 4.
221 Id. at 6-7.
222 Id. at 6.
223 David Byrne, Cyberspace and Consumer Confidence, Address at the Annual
Conference of the Kangaroo Group of MEPs (Sept. 18, 2000), at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
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medium, which makes it imperative that consumers have ìaccess
to the legal system and courts in their own country [as] an
essential part of consumer confidence[.]î224
The FTC is the most active Internet enforcer, but even this
pro-active agency lacks the necessary resources to patrol
cyberspace. It is as if the FTC is trying to hold back a tidal wave
of cyberfraud with a broom.225 The FTC is seeking to increase
efforts in Internet-related enforcement, such as the regulation of
e-mail list marketing, online auction practices, and e-mail
sending software.226
Hardly a day goes by without new media reports of
consumers harmed in cyberspace, yet punitive damages in
Internet cases are rare.227 Punitive damages awards, sometimes
called exemplary, vindictive, penal, or retributory damages, are
designed to punish and deter. Section 908(2) of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts provides that ì[p]unitive damages may be
awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the
defendantís evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights
of others.î228 Consumers are harmed every day in Internet chat
rooms, news groups, and computer bulletin boards by conduct
that calls for the deterrent hammer of punitive damages. Online
chats may seem informal and relaxed, but an online posting in a
chat room or on a web site may become the basis of a defamation
lawsuit.229 Few consumers have the resources to vindicate their
rights in the online world.

dgs/health_consumer/library/speeches/speech55_en.html.
224 Id.
225 Internet enforcement is only one small sector of the FTCís responsibilities to
protect consumers from unfair and deceptive trade practices:
The [FTC] enforces 46 federal laws, including many laws that apply to web
sites. Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. ßß 41-58, the
Commission seeks to: (a) prevent unfair methods of competition, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce; (b) obtain money and other
relief for injured consumers; (c) define and prevent unfair or deceptive
practices; and (d) investigate the business, practices, and management of
entities engaged in commerce.
Federal Trade Commission Actions Affecting Web Sites & E-Commerce, at
http://www.keytlaw.com/FTC/ftcactions.htm (last modified Sept. 2, 2003).
226 FTC Examining Spam Lists and E-Mail Sending Programs, WASH. INTERNET
DAILY, March 28, 2002, at 1 (LEXIS, CURNWS Library).
227 See, e.g., Over the Counter ñ American Websites Selling Fake UK Degrees,
OVERSEAS OVERWHELMED (Higher-Edge), Mar. 12, 2003, at http://www.higheredge.com/oov-archive.htm (shutting down web sites selling fake degrees from universities
which used an address in Palmers Green, North London, to make their operations appear
respectable, defrauding hundreds of thousands of mostly U.S. customers).
228 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ß 908(2) (1979).
229 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 35, at A33; Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly
Traded Company, 542 S.E.2d 377, 379 (Va. 2001); Graham v. Oppenhiemer, No. 00-CV57, 2000 WL 33381418, at *1 (E.D. Va. Dec. 15, 2000).

RUSTAD FINAL - MAY 28

81
A.

5/28/2004 4:30 PM

Punitive Damages in Cyberspace

[Vol. 7:39

Why Punitive Damages Have Not Developed For Consumers

1. CDA Immunity Breeds Irresponsibility
The most significant reason why there are so few consumers
using the remedy of punitive damages in cyberspace is the
blanket immunity granted to ISPs by Congress. One of the
unintended consequences of 42 U.S.C. ß 230, the
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (ìCDAî),230 is that it
immunizes unfair, deceptive, and predatory practices in
cyberspace. One of the statutory purposes of ß 230 was to protect
the ìinfant industryî of online service providers, such as America
Online, CompuServe, and Prodigy, from tort liability arising out
of postings by customers.231 Section 230 of the CDA immunizes
ISPs for torts committed by subscribers and third parties.232 The
long-term consequence of ß 230 is to grant blanket immunity to
ISPs for many torts in cyberspace. The courts have extended ISP
immunity to nearly every conceivable information-related tort,
including invasion of privacy,233 and negligence.234 The result
has been that ISPs have prevailed in nearly every tort-related
case in the last decade.235 This broad immunity lessens the
incentive for ISPs to develop technologies that will detect or
control third party wrongdoing on their systems.236
47 U.S.C. ß 230 (2001).
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that one of
Congressís purposes was to insulate providers from potentially staggering tort liability).
232 Id. at 331.
233 Does v. Franco Prods., No. 99 C 7885, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8645, at *13-14 (N.D.
Ill. June 21, 2000) (holding that ISPs that host web sites are not liable for postings by
customers), affíd sub nom., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
234 In Lunney v. Prodigy Services Co., 723 N.E.2d. 539 (N.Y. 1999), the court held that
Prodigy was not negligent in failing to prevent an imposter from opening up an account,
posting vulgar messages, and sending threatening e-mails. 723 N.E.2d at 543. The court
recognized that if a duty was imposed on an ISP to prevent people from opening up false
accounts and committing these types of defamatory acts, it would require an inordinate
amount of time and money to study the transactions of millions of subscribers. Id. The
court reasoned that if Prodigy was held liable for the actions of third parties, it would
ìopen an ISP to liability for the wrongful acts of countless potential tortfeasors committed
against countless potential victims.î Id.
235 See, e.g., Smith v. Intercosmos Media Group, No. 02-1964, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24251, at *14-15 (E.D. La., Dec. 17, 2002) (holding that Intercosmos was entitled to
immunity under the Communications Decency Act of 1996 for both damages and
injunctive relief for defamation, libel, or negligence based on allegedly defamatory web
sites set up by its customers); Doe One v. Oliver, 755 A.2d 1000, 1003-04 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 2000) (holding America Online immune from improper e-mail messages sent to
plaintiff motherís employer), affíd, 792 A.2d 911 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002), cert. denied, 796
A.2d 556 (Conn. 2002); Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 43 (Wash. Ct. App.
2001) (dismissing defamation lawsuit against Amazon.com for third partyís posting of
negative comments about the authorís book on site).
236 Section 230 immunity for tort liability for ISPs is reminiscent of how the courts
constructed harsh doctrines such as contributory negligence, the assumption of risk, and
the fellow servant rule to protect nascent industry during the industrialization of
America. See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
230
231
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Courts have extended the impact of ß 230 by insulating
defendants from an even greater range of tort-based lawsuits
filed by consumers.237 In Doe v. GTE Corp.,238 a court dismissed
an action against an ISP that ìprovided web hosting services to
[pornographic web] sites such as ëyoungstuds.comí at which the
hidden-camera videos were offered for sale.î239 The ISP did not
produce or sell the tapes but ìprovided the usual package of
services that enables someone to publish a web site over the
Internet.î240 The package of services that GTE provided the Xrated company consisted of:
(1) static IP (Internet protocol) addresses through which the
web sites may be reached (a web host sometimes registers a
domain name that corresponds to the IP address); (2) a highspeed physical connection through which communications pass
between the Internetís transmission lines and the web sites;
and (3) storage space on a server (a computer and hard disk
that are always on) so that the content of the web sites can be
accessed reliably.241

The advertisements for the X-rated tapes passed over GTEís
network and were stored on its servers.242 However, the federal
district court held that GTE was entitled to immunity under ß
230(c)(1).243 The court reasoned that this section was not only a
definition but also served as immunity in blocking ìcivil liability
when web hosts and other [ISPs] refrain from filtering or
censoring the information on their sites.î244 The Seventh Circuit
affirmed the finding that GTE was neither a publisher nor a
speaker and therefore it was immunized under ß 230.245
In Barrett v. Rosenthal,246 a California appeals court became
the first U.S. court to hold that ß 230 does not immunize an ISP
who republishes defamatory statements authored by a third
party after acquiring knowledge that the statements were
1780-1860, ch. 3 (1977) (arguing that the courts subsidized economic growth through the
legal system by replacing just compensation for limited liability in tort and other
substantive fields of law).
237 Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D.D.C. 1998) (dismissing claim on ß
230 grounds in case involving defamatory postings). See also Lunney v. Prodigy Servs.
Co., 723 N.E.2d 539 (N.Y. 1999) (finding that commercial online service provider was not
liable for defamation claim since it did not ìpublishî allegedly defamatory e-mail
message).
238 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
239 Id. at 657.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 657.
244 Id. at 659.
245 Id. at 662.
246 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
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false.247 The plaintiffs, Dr. Polevoy and Dr. Barrett, were two
medical doctors ìprimarily engaged in combating the promotion
and use of ëalternativeí or ënonstandardí healthcare practices and
products.î248 The plaintiffs maintained Internet ì[w]eb sites that
expos[ed] ëhealth frauds and quackeryí and provid[ed]î consumers
with information about health care alternatives.249
One defendant, Rosenthal, was an alternative health
practitioner who reprinted and distributed a number of false
accusations about the plaintiffs. The defendantís web postings
accused the two doctors of running a ìSlea[z]y ëQuackbusterí
Scam.î250 Dr. Polevoy was accused of stalking women and being
a quack.251 The defendants refused to retract the statements and
the plaintiffs filed suit for libel, conspiracy, and libel per se.252
The trial court struck down their complaint on the grounds that
it violated Californiaís anti-SLAPP statute.253 The trial court
also ruled that ß 230 protected the defendant from liability and
that the defamation claims were not supported by sufficient proof
that the plaintiffs suffered monetary losses.254 The appellate
court affirmed the application of the anti-SLAPP statute as to Dr.
Barrett, but not as to Dr. Polevoy.255 The appellate court also
ruled that the trial court erred in requiring Dr. Polevoy to prove
damages since the defamatory language posted on the web site
was libel per se.256
The court ruled that the federal immunity of ß 230 was
inapplicable since Rosenthal was a ìuser of an interactive
computer serviceî and a primary publisher who was strictly
liable for libelous statements.257 The court ruled that ß 230 does
not ìabrogate the common law principle that one who republishes
defamatory matter originated by a third person is subject to
[distributor] liability if he or she knows or has reason to know of
its defamatory character.î258 The court refused to follow a Fourth
Circuit opinion that ß 230 ìimmunized providers and users of
interactive computer services from liability not only as primary

Id. at 167.
Id. at 144.
Id.
Id. at 146 (alteration in original).
Barrett, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 149.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 143-44. The court noted that the California statute barred strategic
lawsuits against public participation. Id.
254 Id. at 146.
255 Id.
256 Barrett, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 146-47.
257 Id. at 151.
258 Id. at 152 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, ß 581(1)) (emphasis omitted).
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
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publishers but also as distributors.î259 The court reasoned that
providers or users who knowingly distribute defamatory
materials produced by third parties should be subject to
liability.260 The court noted that ß 230, on its face, did not clearly
address whether Congress intended to overthrow the wellestablished common law principle of distributor liability.261
However, after a review of the legislative history, the court
observed that the survival of distributor liability was consistent
with ß 230.262
It may be that the Barrett case is ushering in a new era
when courts will begin to retrench and reform ß 230 to the
balance between immunity and tort responsibility. The court in
Barrett compared the ìlack of clarity as to the boundary of the
immunity [in the CDA to] the specificity of the immunity granted
under the Digital Millennium Copyright Actî (ìDMCAî).263 It
may be proper to grant immunity for publishing content supplied
by third parties; however, it is improper to extend that liability to
transmitting knowingly libelous statements. Congress should
make it clear that distributorship liability may be imposed for
transmitting defamatory statements after acquiring notice.
Congress could, for example, enact safe harbor provisions that
parallel the intermediary liability standards of the Digital
Millenium Copyright Act. One promising reform would be to
implement a ìtake-downî policy like the one Congress enacted in
the DMCA.264 The DMCAís safe harbor provisions,265 unlike ß
230 of the CDA, balance freedom of expression against copyright
infringement.266
The DMCA limits the potential liability of ISPs only if they
satisfy the safe harbor provisions.267 With few exceptions, a
259

1997)).

Id. at 153-54 (declining to follow Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir.

Id. at 152.
Barrett, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 155-58.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 158 n.11 (citing 17 U.S.C. ß 512).
The DMCA limits online providersí liability for usersí copyright infringement so
long as the provider takes down the offending material promptly upon notice. 17 U.S.C. ß
512(c) (1996 & Supp. 2003). The DMCA was signed into law by President Clinton in
1998. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998: U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY 1 (1998), available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/d
mca.pdf. The DMCA amends the federal Copyright Act in Title 17 of the United States
Code to develop greater protection for materials transmitted in the Internet environment.
Id. at 3. One of the more controversial provisions of the DMCA is the prohibition against
circumventing technological measures controlling access to works provided by the
Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. ß 1201 (1996 & Supp. 2003).
265 17 U.S.C. ß 512(a), (c).
266 Barrett, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 158 n.11.
267 The DMCA does not confer an absolute immunity upon ISPs like 42 U.S.C. ß 230
because the immunities of ISPs are limited to specific functions they perform. See 17
260
261
262
263
264
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party satisfying the requirements for one of the safe harbors
cannot be liable for monetary, injunctive, or other equitable
relief.268 A reconstructed ß 230 of the CDA would only grant ISP
tort immunity if it fulfilled the requirements for a safe harbor.
An ISP could, for example, be immune from tort liability unless it
knew or should have known that the tortious activity was
occurring on its system and aided in the accomplishment of the
direct tortfeasorís purpose by allowing the postings to continue.
2. Internet Usage of Trade That Waives Consumer
Protection
a. Adhesive Internet Consumer Contracts
Another significant reason why punitive damages have not
yet evolved to protect consumers in cyberspace is because of
contracts of adhesion.269 Consumers are largely foreclosed from
the possibility of seeking punitive damages by adhesive license
agreements and web site terms of service agreements.270 The
U.S. Internet and software industry universally require
consumers to waive any meaningful warranties and tort
remedies and to agree to litigate disputes in distant and
inconvenient forums.
i. Internet Choice of Forum Clauses
ìChoice of forumî is a contractual provision that
predetermines the judicial or arbitral forum in the event of a
dispute arising out of an Internet or web site agreement. For
example, Disney requires all disputes to be decided in a state or
federal court located in Los Angeles County,271 and Nokia
requires disputes to be submitted to an arbitrator in Finland.272
In addition, America Onlineís forum selection clause for its
members provides that ìëexclusive jurisdiction for any claim or
U.S.C. ß 512(a), (c).
268 17 U.S.C. ß 512 (providing a rather narrow exception under ß 512(j)).
269 See generally Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of AdhesionóSome Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943) (noting that the concept of
adhesion contracts refers to contracts in which the weaker party must adhere to the
stronger partyís terms).
270 See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150-51 (7th Cir. 1997)
(enforcing an arbitration clause in a shrink-wrap license); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86
F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (enforcing shrink-wrap license term). See generally
Michael Rustad & Lori E. Eisenschmidt, The Commercial Law of Internet Security, 10
HIGH TECH. L.J. 213, 289-93 (1995).
271 Jurisdictional Clauses in Current Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap Contracts,
Consumer Project on Technology, at http://www.cptech.org/ecom/ucita/licenses/jurisdiction
.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2004) (citing clause in Disneyís terms of service or license
agreement) [hereinafter Jurisdictional Clauses].
272 Id.
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dispute with AOL or relating in any way to your membership
with or your use of AOL resides in the courts of Virginia.íî273
ii.

Internet Choice-of-Law Clauses
Internet
merchants
use
choice-of-law
clauses
to
predetermine the legal remedies that apply for disputes involving
the online contract.
Dell Financial Services, for example,
requires that the law of Texas govern all claims relating to its
web site.274 The Alturian GPS Software web site applies the law
of Belgium in the event of disputes.275 The licensing agreement
of RealNetworks, Inc. requires consumers to resolve all disputes
before binding arbitration applying Washington state law.276
If, for example, a consumer violated the RealNetworks
license agreement by exceeding the scope of its use restrictions,
the company could seek an injunction in federal court, a right not
granted to consumers.277 United States courts have been inclined
to enforce Internet or software license agreements with terms
inimical to consumer welfare such as pro-vendor forum selection
clauses, anti-warranties, and limitations of remedies.278 In
general, courts have been willing to enforce Internet contracts so
long as the user has an opportunity to review the terms of the
contract and manifest assent to the license agreement.279 During
the 1990s, companies were able to avoid many contractual
273 Freedman v. Am. Online, Inc., No. 3:03cvl048, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22019, at *2
(D. Conn. Dec. 5, 2003) (quoting America Online Member Agreement), vacated, No.
3:03cv1048, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1388 (D. Conn. Jan. 30, 2004).
274 Jurisdictional Clauses, supra note 271.
275 Id.
276 REALNETWORKS, INC. END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT, RealNetworks,
Inc., at http://web.nps.navy.mil/nssliao/realplayer/playrlic.html (last visited Jan. 31,
2004).
277 Id. RealNetworks (ìRNî) requires consumers to waive access to U.S. courts while
reserving its own rights. For any violation of RN intellectual property rights, ìRN may
seek injunctive relief, or any other appropriate relief, in any court of competent
jurisdiction.î Id.
278 See, e.g., Hughes v. McMenamon, 204 F. Supp. 2d 178, 181 (D. Mass. 2002)
(finding that subscriber agreed to the license agreement and the forum selection clause
was enforceable); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 530, 532-33 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) (upholding forum selection clause where subscribers to online
software were required to review license terms in scrollable window and to click ìI Agreeî
or ìI Donít Agreeî); Groff v. Am. Online, Inc., No. PC 97-0331, 1998 WL 307001, at *6 (R.I.
Super. Ct. May 27, 1998) (holding user was bound by forum selection clause in online
license agreement); Barnett v. Network Solutions, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 200, 204-05 (Tex. App.
2001) (upholding forum selection clause in online contract for registering Internet domain
names that required users to scroll through terms before accepting or rejecting them).
279 See, e.g., Caspi, 732 A.2d at 532 (enforcing mass market agreement even though
the user could assent without scrolling to the bottom of the license agreement by clicking
the ìI agreeî icon on the screen). See generally Christina L. Kunz et al., Click-Through
Agreements: Strategies for Avoiding Disputes on Validity of Assent, 57 BUS. LAW. 401, 40203 (2001) (citing cases that consider the userís ease or difficulty of viewing terms as a
major factor in enforcing licensing agreements).
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disputes with consumers by convincing courts to enforce onesided choice-of-law provisions and other adhesive Internet
contracts.
The U.S. market-based approach assumes that it is enough
consumer protection for Internet merchants and software
vendors to simply make adequate disclosures that the consumers
are waiving their legal rights and remedies.
The theory
underlying ìadequate disclosureî is that consumers will choose
vendors with more favorable license terms.280 However, this is
not possible in the Internet industry where consumers are
required to waive their rights and remedies. The practical
reality is that consumers have no legal recourse against Internet
merchants.
It is improbable that a U.S. consumer will opt to file a claim
that must be filed across the country or in an overseas venue.
ì[R]equiring consumers to travel to a foreign and oftentimes
remote forum to seek redress in an unfamiliar legal system . . .
would in many cases effectively deny consumers access to judicial
redress.î281
The Internet challenges choice-of-law principles because it
ìis not a physical or tangible entity, but rather a giant network
which interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked
Punitive damages arising out of
computer networks.î282
consumer transactions in cyberspace will be stillborn if U.S.
courts continue to enforce choice-of-law and forum-selection
clauses. Punitive damages cannot develop if choice-of-law and
forum clauses are considered to be ìprima facie valid and should
be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to
be ëunreasonableí under the circumstances.î283
b.

Waiver of Internet Consumerís Right to Seek Tort
Remedies
A Dilbert cartoon lampoons these adhesion contracts by
depicting a licensee who unwraps the shrink-wrap only to learn
that he has become Bill Gateís towel boy.284 In the cartoon,
Dilbert states, ìI didnít read all of the shrink-wrap license
agreement on my new software until after I opened it.
280 Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and
Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1806, 1810 (2000).
281 Karen Stewart & Joseph Matthews, Online Arbitration of Cross-Border, Business
to Consumer Disputes, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1111, 1126 (2002).
282 CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (S.D. Ohio
1997).
283 The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
284 Scott Adams, Dilbert, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1997, at D2.
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Apparently, I agreed to spend the rest of my life as a towel boy in
Bill Gatesí[s] new mansion.î285 Shrink-wrap and web-wrap
contracts are standard form contracts for the electronic age. The
standard form contract dominates cyberspace just as it
dominates every other domain of everyday life.286
In the typical mass-market license agreement, consumers
routinely waive their right to seek punitive damages and
foreclose the possibility of all but the most limited remedy under
the UCC. Online users are offered ìtake it-or-leave itî web-wrap
or terms of service consumers agreements that foreclose the
possibility of punitive damages and any other tort remedy.287
Nearly every Internet merchant dictates the choice-of-law as a
condition for accessing its services or using its goods. No
consumer negotiates with Bill Gates or Jeff Bezos in the Internet
economy. Requiring consumers to waive their rights to a jury
trial is a controversial practice because the Internet industry is
unwilling to give even the most rudimentary implied warranties
of quality. One can read thousands of click-stream, click-wrap,
shrink-wrap, and terms of service agreements and never find a
single Internet vendor willing to provide meaningful warranties
or remedies for its software, software products, or services.
The typical Internet-related mass-market license agreement
provides no warranties of any kind and forecloses any remedy by
requiring the consumer to litigate in a forum of the vendorís
choice, which is often in a distant forum. The following antiwarranties clause of an online pharmacy is fairly typical of what
consumers encounter in cyberspace:
Disclaimer of Warranties. YOU EXPRESSLY UNDERSTAND
THAT AND AGREE THAT:
a. YOUR USE OF THE SERVICE IS AT [YOUR] SOLE
RISK. THE SERVICE IS PROVIDED ON AN ìAS ISî
Id.
Shrink-wrap contracts are the newest form of standard form contracts that
predominate our everyday life. Professor Slawson wrote in 1971 that:
Standard form contracts probably account for more than ninety-nine
percent of all the contracts now made.
Most persons have difficulty
remembering the last time they contracted other than by standard form; except
for casual oral agreements, they probably never have. But if they are active,
they contract by standard form several times a day. Parking lot and theater
tickets, package receipts, department store charge slips, and gas station credit
card purchase slips are all standard form contracts.
285
286

. . . The contracting still imagined by courts and law teachers as typical, in
which both parties participate in choosing the language of their entire
agreement, is no longer of much more than historical importance.
W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971).
287 See Braucher, supra note 260, at 1832.
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AND ìAS AVAILABLEî BASIS. PHARMACY CHOICE
EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES OF ANY
KIND,
WHETHER
EXPRESS
OR
IMPLIED,
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE IMPLIED
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR
A
PARTICULAR
PURPOSE
AND
NONINFRINGEMENT.
PHARMACY CHOICE MAKES NO WARRANTY THAT (i)
THE SERVICE WILL MEET YOUR REQUIREMENTS,
(ii) THE SERVICE WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED,
TIMELY, SECURE, EFFICIENT, OR ERROR FREE, (iii)
THE RESULTS THAT MAY BE OBTAINED FROM THE
USE OF THE SERVICE WILL BE ACCURATE OR
RELIABLE, (iv) THE QUALITY OF ANY PRODUCT,
SERVICE, INFORMATION, OR OTHER MATERIAL
PURCHASED OR OBTAINED BY YOU THROUGH THE
SERVICE WILL MEET YOUR EXPECTATIONS, AND (v)
ANY ERRORS IN THE SOFTWARE WILL BE
CORRECTED.
ANY MATERIAL DOWNLOADED OR OTHERWISE
OBTAINED THROUGH THE USE OF THE SERVICE IS
DONE AT YOUR OWN RISK AND DISCRETION. YOU
WILL BE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY DAMAGE
TO YOUR COMPUTER SYSTEM OR LOSS OF DATA
THAT RESULTS FROM THE DOWNLOAD OF ANY
SUCH MATERIAL.
NO ADVICE OR INFORMATION, WHETHER ORAL OR
WRITTEN, OBTAINED BY YOU FROM PHARMACY
CHOICE OR THROUGH OR FROM THE SERVICE
SHALL CREATE ANY WARRANTY NOT EXPRESSLY
STATED . . . .
NEITHER PHARMACY CHOICE NOR YOU MAY
MODIFY OR WAIVE THE DISCLAIMERS PROVIDED
FOR IN THIS SECTION . . . .
NO ORAL
MODIFICATIONS OR WAIVER OF THIS DISCLAIMER
SHALL BE VALID OR BINDING ON PHARMACY
CHOICE.288

Amazon.comís terms of service agreement forecloses
consumers from seeking punitive damages or any other type of
tort damages.289 The most popular search engine, Google.com,
has a term of service that precludes the possibility of obtaining
288 Pharmacy Choice Terms and Conditions of Service, at http://www.pharmacychoice
.com/home/terms.cfm (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
289 Conditions of Use, at http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/browse/-/508088/1026759433-7263313 (last visited Jan. 26, 2004) (ìAMAZON.COM WILL NOT BE LIABLE
FOR ANY DAMAGES OF ANY KIND ARISING FROM THE USE OF THIS SITE,
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE,
AND CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.î).
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punitive damages:
Under no circumstances shall Google be liable to any user on
account of that userís use or misuse of Google Web APIs. Such
limitation of liability shall apply to prevent recovery of direct,
indirect, incidental, consequential, special, exemplary, and
punitive damages whether such claim is based on warranty,
contract, tort (including negligence), or otherwise, [(]even if
Google has been advised of the possibility of such damages).290

The eBay User Agreement requires its users to ìread, agree
with and accept all of the terms and conditions contained in this
User Agreement and the Privacy Policy, which include those
terms and conditions expressly set out below and those
incorporated by reference,î before they can access the eBay
system.291 One of the terms of service for eBay is the absolute
prohibition on seeking punitive damages under any doctrinal
theory.292
c. Mandatory Consumer Protection in Cyberspace
The solution to adhesive Internet contracts is to either
extend punitive damages to cyberspace or adopt a system of
ìthickî regulations such as the European Union regime of
mandatory consumer protection terms.293 None of the countries
of the European Union other than the United Kingdom recognize
the doctrine of punitive damages.294 The Brussels Regulation, for
290 Terms and Conditions for Google Web API Service, at http://www.google.com/apis/
api_terms.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
291 User Agreement, at http://pages.ebay.com/help/community/png-user.html (last
visited Jan. 26, 2004).
292 The user agreement states:
UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHALL EBAY BE LIABLE TO ANY USER
ON ACCOUNT OF THAT USERíS USE OR MISUSE OF EBAY TOOLBAR.
SUCH LIMITATION OF LIABILITY SHALL APPLY TO PREVENT
RECOVERY OF DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL,
SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES WHETHER SUCH
CLAIM IS BASED ON WARRANTY, CONTRACT, TORT (INCLUDING
NEGLIGENCE), OR OTHERWISE, (EVEN IF EBAY HAS BEEN ADVISED
OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES).
User License Agreement, http://pages.ebay.com/ebay_toolbar/download.html (last visited
Jan. 26, 2004).
293 The European Union (ìEUî) was formed in the 1950s and now includes fifteen
member states located in the Eurozone. James E. Pfander, Member State Liability and
Constitutional Change in the United States and Europe, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 237, 239
(2003). The EU is set to add another ten member states in 2004. Id. ìThe European
Council refers to meetings of the heads of state of the 15 [EU] member states.î RUSTAD &
DAFTARY, supra note 76, at ß 8.02[A]. The European Unionís key consumer protection
directives address distance selling, data protection, and e-commerce. Id.
294 See Christopher Hodges, Multi-Party Actions: A European Approach, 11 DUKE J.
COMP. & INTíL L. 321, 330 (2001) (ìNo European jurisdiction generally permits punitive
damages . . . .î). But see Rookes v. Barnard, 1964 A.C. 1129, 1131 (H.L. 1964) (appeal
taken from Eng.) (noting that in the United Kingdom, a restricted form of exemplary
damages is recognized in a handful of aggravating circumstances).
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example, gives consumers the right to sue suppliers in their
home court.295 It provides that if a business ìpursues commercial
or professional activities in the Member State,î then the
consumer may sue in the court where he or she is domiciled.296
The far-reaching consumer provisions also apply to U.S.
companies targeting European consumers in Internet
transactions.297 Therefore, European Union rules will likely
become the de facto consumer protection law for the Internet
since non-European Union countries will be subject to its rules.
The European Union model tacitly assumes that mandatory
consumer protection is required in cyberspace and elsewhere.
The Distance Selling Directive, for example, requires sellers to
provide consumers with information about the identity of the
supplier, the main characteristics of goods and services including
taxes, delivery costs, arrangements for payment, the existence of
a right of withdrawal, the period for which the offer remains
valid, and the minimum duration of the contract.298
The European Directive on Consumer Goods contains
provisions that apply equally well to Internet sales.299 The
Directive, for example, gives consumers a two-year period to
The Directive
exercise rights as to defective products.300
presumes that any non-conformity found in the first six months
after delivery existed at tender, and European consumers under
the Consumer Goods Directive have a right of repair or
replacement without charge or inconvenience.301 Under the
Directive, any waiver of rights in a contractual agreement signed
by European consumers is not binding.302
295 The European Union countries are promulgating some of the most extensive
regulations of cyberspace.
Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1. The Brussels Regulation replaces the 1968 Brussels
Convention effective March 2002. Id. at 14, 16. The Brussels Regulation applies to all
EU countries that signed the Brussels Convention of 1968 except Denmark. Id. at 3. The
new Brussels Regulation has not yet supplanted the Lugano Convention of 1988. Id. at 1,
14-15. The Brussels Regulation governs jurisdiction in civil and commercial disputes
between litigants and provides for the enforcement of judgments. Id. at 3, 11.
296 Id. at 6. Article 15(1)(c) extends the consumer home forum rule to entities that
direct activities to Member States. Id.
297 See id. at 7. The Brussels Regulation has legal force in the Member States of the
European Union. However, U.S. companies with a presence in a Member State and
conducting business with European consumers would be subject to the pro-consumer
home court rule. Thomas C. Vinje and Ann-Charlotte Hogberg, Whose Law Governs in
EU?: Draft ìRome IIî Regulation Threatens Certainty of 2000 Directive, N.Y. LAW
JOURNAL, April 30, 2001, at S3.
298 European Parliament & Council Directive 97/7/EC, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19-27.
299 European Parliament & Council Directive 1999/44/EC, 1999 O.J. (L 171) 12.
300 Id. at 15.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 16.
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Internet contracts with European consumers must also
comply with the Unfair Terms Directive.303 The Directive has an
express policy of policing unfair terms where there is an
imbalance of power between the company and consumer.304 It
applies to a wide range of one-sided Internet contracts where the
terms are offered on a ìtake-it-or-leave-itî basis. Any ambiguity
in a consumer contract is construed against the company in favor
of the consumer.305 The central provision of the Unfair Terms
Directive is that contractual terms found to be unfair are
unenforceable.306 In contrast, the U.S. market-based approach
tends to be opposed to such pro-welfaristic consumer protection
regimes.
The extension of punitive damages to protect
consumers is consistent with the U.S. pro-market approach with
its emphasis on flexibility and pragmatism.
B. Extending Punitive Damages for Consumer and Individual
Protection in Cyberspace
Few consumer lawyers have the resources to pursue an
Internet wrongdoer capable of fleeing the jurisdiction with the
click of the mouse. Even if the Internet wrongdoer can be
located, there remains a problem with default judgments.
Consumers will be more likely to obtain collectible judgments
from Internet elephants rather than elusive mice, but may not be
aware that attorneys are available to work on a contingency
basis. Alternatively, the amount of money involved may be so
miniscule for any one Internet user that the victim may not feel
that he or she has the time, energy, or expertise to prosecute a
fraudulent Internet merchant. Many Internet users may each
have a small loss resulting from a pattern and practice of
dishonesty.
1. Remedy for Socially Compensable Damages
The legal environment of the Internet is a perfect venue for
an expanded remedy of punitive damages.
Judge Guido
Calabresi drew the classic distinction between specific deterrence
that makes the wrongdoer pay the price of wrongdoing and the
larger social sanction of general deterrence, which vindicates the
harm to society.307 The concept of general deterrence may be
seen in the earliest exemplary damages cases where awards were
Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29.
Id.
Id.
Id.
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis,
111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 877 & n.13 (1998).
303
304
305
306
307
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made ìfor exampleís sake.î308 Punitive damages against spam emailers are good examples of what Judge Calabresi defines as
ìsocially compensatory damages.î309 The purpose of socially
compensatory damages is ìto make society whole,î as opposed to
compensatory damages, which are ìassessed to make the
individual victim whole.î310 Tort lawís capacity to efficiently
punish and deter conduct through socially compensable damages
is central to Judge Calabresiís theory of punitive damages.311
Judge Calabresi argues that in many cases ìcompensatory
damages are . . . an inaccurate measure of the true harm caused
by an activity.î312
Consumers need a fortified punitive damages remedy
precisely for purposes of optimal deterrence. Ordinary damages
are an insufficient deterrent where the gain to the defendant
exceeds any compensable injury. General deterrence requires
punitive damages to convince other Internet wrongdoers that
there is no profit in wrongdoing. Merely requiring an Internet
company to disgorge the amount by which it was unjustly
enriched is an insufficient deterrent. Without the threat of
uncapped punitive damages, it would be beneficial for the
fraudulent Internet business to wait until it was discovered or
sued before disgorging what was owed. As the court stated in
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co.,313 if it were not for punitive damages
then ì[s]ome may think it cheaper to pay damages or a forfeiture
than to change a business practice.î314 The purpose of punitive
damages in cyberspace is the same as in the bricks-and-mortar
world of compensating the larger society for uncompensated
external costs.315 Punitive damages are ìan appropriate way of
making the injurer bear all the costs associated with its
activities.î316 In the first decade of cyberspace punitive damages,
there have been some notable examples where the remedy served
to root out socially harmful web site activity.
2. Serving as a Death Penalty to Internet Harassment
ìCyberstalking refers to the use of the Internet, e-mail, or
other electronic means to repeatedly threaten, follow, or harass

Tullidge v. Wade, 95 Eng. Rep. 909, 909 (K.B. 1769).
Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 245 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J.,
concurring).
310 Id. (Calabresi, J. concurring).
311 Id. at 243, 245 (Calabresi, J. concurring).
312 Id. at 244 (Calabresi, J. concurring).
313 294 N.W.2d 437 (Wis. 1980).
314 Id. at 451 (citing Walker v. Sheldon, 179 N.E.2d 497, 499 (N.Y. 1961)).
315 In re Simon II Litig., 211 F.R.D. 86, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
316 Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 244 (Calabresi, J. concurring).
308
309
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another person.î317 Internet wrongdoers, for example, have
harmed women by maliciously posting personal information on
sadomasochistic web sites and by using new morphing
technologies to superimpose their victimís face onto pornographic
pictures.318 For example, an online stalker who posted profane,
derogatory, and harassing messages threatening violence to
female musicians was assessed with punitive damages.319
In Hitchcock v. Woodside Literary Agency,320 Jayne
Hitchcock, a University of Maryland teaching assistant, alleged
she was the victim of a campaign of electronic terror by an online
Ms. Hitchcockís nightmare began when she
company.321
answered a web site advertisement soliciting writing samples
from ìëpublished and unpublished authors.íî322 After submitting
a writing sample, she received a letter from Woodside Literary
Agency (ìWLAî) praising her writing and soliciting her to
forward a full manuscript to the agency, ìalong with a $75
ëreading and market evaluation fee.íî323 She mailed a second
sample of her writing to WLA using her maiden name.324 WLA
responded with a virtually identical letter save for soliciting a
$150 reading fee.325 Ms. Hitchcock concluded that WLA was
nothing more than a scam soliciting bogus fees from consumers
seeking to become writers.326 She posted warnings about WLA
on various Internet bulleting boards observing that ìlegitimate
literary agencies did not charge ëreading fees.íî327
Hitchcock allegedly became the target for a systematic
campaign of online harassment by anonymous parties.328 The
harassment took diverse forms, including the posting of messages
that falsely claimed that Hitchcock was the author of
pornography.329 She also received a number of crude e-mail
messages, which placed her in fear of sexual assault.330 Her email accounts were flooded, and offensive messages were sent to

RUSTAD & DAFTARY, supra note 76, at ß 5.03[A] (emphasis omitted).
See, e.g., Butler v. Krebs, No. 96-1204096, 1998 WL 2023763 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June
8, 1998) (awarding punitive damages against airline and pilot for superimposing nude
image of female pilot on web site and intranet).
319 Stockdale v. Baba, 795 N.E.2d 727, 730-33 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
320 15 F. Supp. 2d 246 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
321 Id. at 249.
322 Id. at 248.
323 Id. at 249.
324 Id.
325 Hitchcock, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 249.
326 Id.
327 Id.
328 Id.
329 Id.
330 Hitchcock, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 249.
317
318
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third parties under her name.331 Despite this clear pattern of
systematic online harassment, the federal court dismissed
Hitchcockís RICO332 claim for failure to state a claim since the
defendants could not, by law, constitute a criminal enterprise.333
In the end, the consumer had no remedy available for such
pervasive e-mail harassment and the ìe-mail bombsî that shut
her e-mail account down. The Hitchcock case illustrates the need
for strong consumer self-help remedies to punish egregious
misconduct in cyberspace.
Punitive damages are beginning to be employed to restrain
web sites threatening violence. In Planned Parenthood of
Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life
Activists,334 anti-abortion activists posted ìGUILTYî posters
identifying the names, addresses, and photographs of physicians
that provided abortions.335 The web site developed by the
American Coalition of Life Activists (ìACLAî) personally
identified the plaintiffs on ìDeadly Dozen ëGUILTYíî posters.336
Additionally, ACLA compiled the ìNuremberg Filesî to collect
evidence against abortion doctors so that they could one day be
placed on trial for crimes against humanity.337 ìThe ëGUILTYí
posters identifying specific physicians were circulated in the
wake of a series of ëWANTEDí and ëunWANTEDí posters that had
identified other doctors who performed abortions before they
were murdered.î338
The plaintiffs argued that the distribution of the Old Weststyle Deadly Dozen ìWANTEDî posters identifying the abortion
providers constituted a threat of force under the federal Freedom
of Access to Clinics Entrances Act.339 In three prior incidents, a
ìwantedî-type poster identifying a specific doctor who provided
abortion services was circulated, and the doctor named on the
The jury returned a verdict in the
poster was killed.340
Id.
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (ìRICOî), 18 U.S.C. ßß
1961-1968 (2003), requires that the plaintiff demonstrate ìthat a defendant, employed by
or associated with an enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce, conducted or
participated in the conduct of this enterpriseís affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity.î Hitchcock, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 249 (internal quotation marks omitted).
333 Id. at 249-50.
334 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2637 (2003).
335 Id. at 1062.
336 Id. at 1064.
337 Id. at 1062.
338 Id.
339 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1062. ì[The Freedom of Access to Clinics Act]
gives aggrieved persons a right of action against whoever by ëthreat of force . . .
intentionally . . . intimidates . . . any person because that person is or has been . . .
providing reproductive health services.íî Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C ß 248 (a)(1), (c)(1)(A)).
340 Id. at 1063-64.
331
332
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physiciansí favor, including
$108.5 million in punitive
damages.341
The district court also ìenjoined ACLA from
publishing the posters or providing other materials with the
specific intent to threaten [the physicians].î342 The court found
that the defendants had ìacted with specific intent and malice in
a blatant and illegal communication of true threats to kill,
assault or do bodily harm to each of the plaintiffs and with the
specific intent to interfere with or intimidate the plaintiffs from
engaging in legal medical practices and procedures.î343
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the web site
constituted a true threat as defined under the Freedom of Access
to Clinics Entrances Act and affirmed the ACLAís liability, but
vacated the $108.5 million punitive damages award for the
district court to determine whether it comported with due
process.344 Due to the Ninth Circuitís decision, the threat of
further punitive damages awards has resulted in a number of
providers unplugging the ìNuremberg Filesî site and other antichoice sites, including the ìAbortionCamsî web site, ìwhich
features thousands of photographs and videos of abortion clinic
staff, patients and escorts.î345
Spam e-mailers are continually engaging in cost-benefit
analyses to determine whether a given activity is worth the
price.346 In the calculation of expected profits, the Internet
wrongdoer will likely allow for possible refunds to those victims
who object too vigorously, and will be perfectly content to bear
the additional cost of litigation as the price for continuing an
illicit business. ìIt stands to reason that the chances of deterring
[people] are materially increased by subjecting [them] to the
payment of punitive damages.î347
3. Punishing Incendiary Flame Wars in Cyberspace
Punitive damages have begun to evolve as a social control
against incendiary e-mail exchanges or web site postings.
Consider the case of a 27-year-old British lawyer who received a
Id. at 1066 n.4.
Id. at 1063.
Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life
Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1154 (D. Or. 1999), affíd in part, revíd in part, 290 F.3d
1058 (9th Cir. 2002).
344 Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1063, 1086.
345 Frederick Clarkson, New Version of Nuremberg Files Yanked Off Web, at
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/dyn/aid/1627/context/archive (last visited Jan.
28, 2004). ìThe American Coalition of Life Activists subsequently folded, though most of
its leaders remain active anti-choice militants.î Id.
346 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 68-69 (1970).
347 Walker v. Sheldon, 179 N.E.2d 497, 499 (N.Y. 1961).
341
342
343
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spicy e-mail message at work from his girlfriend.348 The tactless
lawyer forwarded the e-mail to several others, ìboasting, ëNow
THATíS a nice compliment from a lass, isnít it?íî349 A week later,
the firmís web site ìcrashed after receiving 70,000 hits in a single
day.î350 The lawyerís careless e-mail caused him to be disciplined
by his law firm and castigated in the court of public opinion.
This case is an example of the types of e-mails that can cause a
suit for punitive damages.
In Mathis v. Cannon,351 the plaintiff filed a defamation claim
against an Internet poster who accused him of being a thief and a
crook in an online forum addressing concerns about a solid waste
recovery facility.352 The Internet-related postings were the result
of impassioned debates over the expenditure of the countyís
resources for the ill-fated facility.353 However, the plaintiff was
barred from seeking punitive damages because he did not seek a
retraction, which was a prerequisite to filing his defamation
complaint.354
C.

Protecting Individual Reputations in Cyberspace

Punitive damages are evolving to restrain abusive
information-based torts in cyberspace. For example, a University
of North Dakota physics professor filed a lawsuit against a
former student who posted an article about him on the
Internet.355 The student accused the professor ìof being a
pedophile and having odd sexual habits.î356 The professor won
his case and received a punitive damages award for the studentís
postings.357
Damages awarded in online defamation cases frequently
involve head-on collisions with the First Amendment. The facts
of Griffis v. Luban358 exemplify the typical online defamation
case, arising out of an incendiary exchange of e-mails and
postings to a web site. In Griffis, a Minnesota resident was
assessed damages in an Alabama court default judgment after
being sued for posting Internet messages challenging the

Jeffrey Rosen, In Lieu of Manners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2001 (Magazine), at 46.
Id.
Id.
573 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 2002).
Id. at 377, 379.
Id. at 378-79.
Id. at 386.
Carlson, supra note 35, at A33.
Id.
Wagner v. Miskin, 660 N.W.2d 593, 595-96 (N.D. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
1156 (2004).
358 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 906 (2003).
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
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credentials of an Egyptologist.359 The Minnesota resident posted
on a web forum that the Alabama scholar had ìobtain[ed] her
degree from a ëbox of Cracker Jacks.íî360 The Alabama court
entered a default judgment for $25,000 in money damages and
an injunction to prevent future defamatory postings.361 In an
unpublished decision, a Minnesota Court of Appeal overturned
the Alabama injunction as an invalid prior restraint in violation
of the First Amendment.362 The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled
that the Alabama judgment was not entitled to full faith and
credit because the Alabama court lacked personal jurisdiction.363
The court ruled that the Alabama courtís exercise of jurisdiction
was in error because the postings by the plaintiff were not aimed
at the Alabama forum.364
D. Expanded Consumer Protection Through Punitive Justice
Deterrence will only occur when the tortfeasors are held
accountable for their conduct in cyberspace. Given the difficulty
Internet consumers have in detecting, let alone pursuing,
Internet fraudsters, the cost of wrongdoing must be steep enough
to convince even the Internet mice not to repeat the conduct.
Internet elephants must also be punished in excess of their profit
in order to deter similar future behavior. Accordingly, effective
deterrence cannot be achieved without at least the threat of
uncapped punitive damages.
Punitive damages are necessary in cyberspace to punish and
deter wrongful acts such as improper billing, excessive charges,
and consumer chiseling. Suppose an ISP decides to skim $10 off
each consumerís account over a two-year period. The provider
can count on the likelihood that only a small fraction of
consumers will detect the excessive charges. It is also likely that
not every consumer who detects the skimming will successfully
sue for her $10 charge. Limiting an Internet consumer to purely
contractual remedies will result in under-deterrence. It is the
unpredictability of tort law and the remedy of punitive damages
that make the Internet seller or entrepreneur think twice before
engaging in wrongful conduct that is profitable but a serious
social problem to society. Predatory Internet sellers may perform
a cost-benefit analysis deciding that it is profitable to cheat
consumers where the probability of detection is low. Punitive
359
360
361
362

Id. at 530.
Id.
Id.
Griffis v. Luban, No. CX-01-1350, 2002 WL 338139, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 5,

363
364

Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 537.
Id. at 536-37.

2002).
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damages are a deterrent to a company because producers cannot
balance the benefit of chiseling Internet users against the costs of
detection with any certainty.
The cheating of countless consumers in cyberspace is
comparable to the societal wrong described in Walker v.
Sheldon,365 where the New York Court of Appeals observed:
[T]hose who deliberately and cooly [sic] engage in a far-flung
fraudulent scheme, systematically conducted for profit, are
very much more likely to pause and consider the consequences
if they have to pay more than the actual loss suffered by an
individual plaintiff. An occasional award of compensatory
damages against such parties would have little deterrent
effect. A judgment simply for compensatory damages would
require the offender to do no more than return the money,
which he had taken from the plaintiff. In the calculation of his
expected profits, the wrongdoer is likely to allow for a certain
amount of money, which will have to be returned to those
victims who object too vigorously, and he will be perfectly
content to bear the additional cost of litigation as the price for
continuing his illicit business. It stands to reason that the
chances of deterring him are materially increased by subjecting
him to the payment of punitive damages.366

If the probability of detection is low, there is a greater
potential that a spam e-mailer will send millions of unwanted emails. For the Internet merchant tempted to cheat consumers,
he or she must not be able to coldly calculate the worst-case
scenario of paying only what was owed in the first place.
Wrongdoers must know that their financial existence may be
threatened if they violate Internet business norms. In EmeryWaterhouse Co. v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank,367
the First Circuit Court of Appeals portrayed the retention of
money not belonging to a bank as conduct analogous to theft.368
Accordingly, the First Circuit upheld a punitive damages award
against the assignee.369 There are analogous circumstances in
this case when it comes to protecting consumers in cyberspace.
The punishment of Internet defendants who intentionally or
recklessly breach their obligation to treat consumers fairly sends
a signal to the information industry. It is entirely appropriate
that the states punish conduct that violates a recognized public
interest and there is no lesser interest in cyberspace.

365
366
367
368
369

179 N.E.2d 497 (N.Y. 1961).
Id. at 499.
757 F.2d 399 (1st Cir. 1985).
Id. at 408.
Id. at 401.
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The awarding of punitive damages serves the additional
purpose of limiting the defendantís ability to profit from its fraud
by escaping detection and (private) prosecution. If a tortfeasor is
ìcaughtî only half the time he commits torts, then, when he or
she is caught, the tortfeasor should be punished twice as heavily
in order to make up for the times that he or she actually escaped
punishment. As a result, the tortfeasor will be forced to consider
the cost of being caught, not merely the odds of escaping, even if
the tortfeasor is only held accountable for a small portion of his
conduct.
Punitive damages also serve as a mechanism for ensuring
that the ìwrongdoer bears all the costs of its actions, and is thus
appropriately deterred from causing harm, in those categories of
cases in which compensatory damages alone result in systematic
underassessment of costs, and hence in systematic
underdeterrence.î370 The social cost of underdeterrence is that
actors ìwill have an incentive to undertake activities whose social
costs exceed their social benefits.î371 Online thieves are using a
new technique called ìphishingî to steal the identity and credit
card numbers of consumers. As briefly mentioned earlier in this
Article, phishing is the transmittal of e-mails, which appear to
come from major corporations, to consumers.372 The predator
directs consumers to fraudulent web sites that mirror the
companiesí real sites and obtain bank account or credit card
information from the consumers by asking them to verify or
update their accounts.373
The punishment of intentional or reckless breaches of the
obligation to treat Internet consumers fairly is a necessary signal
to new industries. The strong arm of punitive damages is called
into play to punish firms who play fast and loose with Internet
usersí money, data, identity, and right to privacy. Punitive
damages are the only remedy that is tailored to punish and deter
e-businesses from engaging in actions contrary to the public
interest. The underlying public purpose is to teach fraudulent
Internet companies that ìtort does not pay.î374 Punitive damages
encourage plaintiffs to act as ìprivate attorneys generalî and serve
as an incentive to encourage a plaintiff to sue when there is
widespread harm.375
370 Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 243 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J.
concurring).
371 Id. (Calabresi, J. concurring).
372 James Covert, Amazon Sues to Stop E-Mails That Use Its Name, WALL ST. J., Aug.
27, 2003, at D4. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
373 Id.
374 Rookes v. Barnard, 1964 A.C. 1129, 1227 (H.L. 1964) (appeal taken from Eng.).
375 See, e.g., Leslie E. John, Comment, Formulating Standards for Awards of Punitive
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Deterrence cannot be achieved unless the costs of wrongful
conduct are sufficient to induce fraudulent Internet wrongdoers
and others tempted by ill-gotten gains not to repeat the conduct
again. The awarding of punitive damages against Internet
defendants will send a clear message to an e-business corporate
headquarters or offshore haven that it is risky to defraud
consumers. The ultimate goal of punitive damages is to punish
by taking away the ìill gottenî gain, setting an example, and
deterring future conduct of a like nature.
Punitive damages are an efficient remedy to punish and
deter intentional and reckless torts in situations where ìthe
probability of detection is very low and the probability of harm is
very high.î376 Lowering the probability of enforcement implies
that enforcement costs can be minimized. The lower that the
probability of detection is, the fewer the resources devoted to
enforcement need to be, and the fine can be set high enough so
that the fine multiplied by the probability of its being imposed
(the ìexpected fineî) reaches the optimal level for deterrence.377
A large punitive damages award is necessary to achieve optimal
deterrence where the probability that any one Internet user will
uncover wrongdoing is minimal.378
The Fifth Circuit in Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.379
stated that ìpunitive damages reward individuals who serve as
ëprivate attorneys generalí in bringing wrongdoers to account.î380
Private attorneys general provide a backup in situations in which
government enforcement agencies fail to adequately protect the
public. Fraud in the e-business executive suites will typically be
more difficult and expensive to detect and prosecute than crime
in the streets.
Damages in the Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 CAL. L. REV. 2033, 2051-52 (1986)
(arguing that punitive damages are an incentive to sue where the plaintiff might not
otherwise do so or when the defendant is unlikely to be prosecuted criminally). See also
Susan Abramson, Note, Crawling Out from Under Boulder, 34 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 303,
337-38 (1984) (arguing that private damage remedy fulfills ìprivate attorney generalî
functions). The policy behind attorney fee shifting is also justified on a ìprivate attorney
generalî rationale. See Thomas D. Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A
Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 653 (1982) (ì[T]he ëprivate attorney generalí
theory justifies a fee award on the basis of the public usefulness of advancing a particular
type of claim.î).
376 Thomas Koenig, The Law Arises Out of Fact, Even for a ìPoet Laureate,î 28
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1021, 1033 n.47. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 160-61 (1987).
377 See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76
J. POL. ECON. 169, 190-93 (1968).
378 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the
Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880, 880-81 (1979).
379 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986), abrogation recognized by Centennial Ins. Co. v.
Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 149 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 1998).
380 Id. at 403.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The remedy of punitive damages is particularly well-suited
to assist consumers in unmasking deliberate, concealed economic
harms, like those suffered by the victims of computer viruses,
fraudulent Internet sales and services, and the routine invasions
of privacy that compromise the identity of users.381 Without
exemplary damages, the predatory Internet wrongdoers run little
probability of detection if they injure a large number of consumers
in relatively minor ways such as through pop-up ads, spam e-mail,
or hidden charges. A popular misconception contends that
punitive damage awards have spun out of control, threatening
big, vulnerable companies. This is simply not so. Punitive
damages are appropriate where a cyberspace defendant has
acted in reckless indifference of the rights of large groups of
consumers with the calculated purpose of making illicit profits.382
Limiting a consumer cheated in a cyberspace transaction to
purely contractual remedies will certainly result in diminished
deterrence. Despite the theoretical promise of punitive damages
for protecting consumers, the remedy is stillborn. Punitive
damages are particularly needed to punish and deter conduct on
the borderline between the law of torts and criminal law in
cyberspace. Punitive damages are needed now more than ever by
consumers to detect and punish fraudsters, predators, and other
online criminals on the World Wide Web. In cyberspace, punitive
damages have a potentially useful role of deterring reprehensible
conduct that, although arguably rational from the standpoint of
the particular Internet predator, has widespread social costs for
consumers and for society. Internet wrongdoers must know they
cannot estimate the cost of their misdeeds by coldly calculating
the cost of paying compensatory damages. Internet con artists
must know that their financial existence may be threatened by
shortchanging Internet users, violating their privacy, or trading
upon their identity.

381 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, New Light on Punitive Damages,
REGULATION, Sept.-Oct. 1986, at 33.
382 For example, punitive damages have been deemed appropriate against insurance
companies that chisel small amounts from their policyholders. See, e.g., Hawkins v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073, 1085 (Ariz. 1987).
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APPENDIX
Research Methods for Study of Punitive Damages in Cyberspace
The term ìInternetî appeared in 1,559 state and federal
opinions issued in 2002 but only a small percentage of these
cases appear in the sample because the role of the Internet was
only incidental in most of this litigation.383 This study examined
all Internet-related cases in which there was an equitable or
legal remedy during the years 1992-2002.
Since no international, federal, or state agency
systematically collects data on Internet-related cases, all
available published and unpublished data sources were searched.
The following sources were exhaustively examined: (1) trial
verdict reporters;384 (2) LEXIS and WESTLAWís federal and
state databases and news services;385 (3) cyberspace research
libraries of law firms;386 (4) national, regional, and local verdict
reporters;387 (5) reports of domain name disputes;388 (6)
383 For example, in Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir.
2002), the court reviewed the United States Forest Serviceís ìRoadless Area Conservation
Rule.î Id. at 1104. The courtís reference to the Forest Serviceís posting of the rule on its
web site is not sufficient to qualify the case for the study of cyberspace litigation. Id. at
1119.
384 The combined jury verdicts and settlements database of LEXIS reports verdicts
from Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah and Vermont. Most state verdict reporters cover the entire period of this study
(1992-2002). In addition, I examined the National Jury Verdict Review & Analysis, and
the Combined Jury Verdicts and Settlements sources.
385 I examined all federal district court decisions, federal appellate decisions, and
state appellate decisions reported in WESTLAW and LEXIS. Searches were conducted
for internet-related cases using the following searches: (1) hlead (internet or e-mail or web
or world wide web or worldwide web) and damages or injunction; (2) internet or website or
web site or world wide web or www and damage or award or injunct! and date aft 1992;
(3) atleast3 (Internet or cyberspace or world wide web or e-mail) and verdict or judgment
and date aft 1992.
386 I searched the 300-plus Internet law cases published in the Phillips Nizer Internet
Law Library. Martin H. Samson, Internet Library of Law and Court Decisions, at
http://www.phillipsnizer.com/internetlib.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2004). The Seattle law
firm of Perkins, Coie publishes the Internet Case Digest, which is an online ìcompilation of
cases designed to bookmark, collate and monitor important developments in Internet law,
including cases that have significant implications for Internet legal issues even if they are
not directly related to the Internet. The Digest includes both filed and decided cases to
capture the most recent developments as well as new judicial precedents.î Internet Case
Digest, at http://www.perkinscoie.com/casedigest/default.cfm (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
The Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP web site was an important
resource because of its exhaustive collection of Internet-related trademark cases. Internet
Trademark Case Summaries, http://www.finnegan.com/publications/index.cfm?info=trade
mark (last visited Feb. 19, 2004).
387 In WESTLAW, I reviewed the Combined Jury Verdicts and Settlements, which
included: (1) Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ìATLAî); (2) California Jury
Verdicts and Judgments; (3) Florida Jury Verdict Reporter; (4) Jury Verdict and
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individual cyberspace cases reported on law firm web sites;389 (7)
law school research centers;390 (8) American Law Reports (ìALRî)
annotations;391 (9) all Internet-related Mealey publications;392
(10) e-commerce law secondary sources;393 (11) Internet
treatises;394 (12) legal news services;395 (13) Security and
Exchange Commission (ìSECî) filings;396 and (14) general news397
Settlement Summaries; and (5) Verdict Settlements. All of these sources had complete
data for the years studied.
388 I searched the combined domain name disputes and decisions but did not include
cases channeled to the Uniform Dispute Resolution Procedures (ìUDRPî) developed by
World Intellectual Property Organization (ìWIPOî). Since the end of 1999, most domain
name disputes have been decided by one or three person alternate dispute resolution
panels rather than by the federal courts. As part of the process of registering a domain
name, the registrant agrees to submit complaints filed by third parties to alternative
dispute resolution panels. These proceedings are quick, inexpensive, and adjudicate
domain name disputes between litigants in different countries. Panels have the limited
power of ordering the transfer or cancellation of domain names and cannot award
damages, attorneyís fees, or costs. Unlike court cases, the UDRP are informal, nonappealable, and stare decisis is not followed. The sample of domain name cases is limited
to those filed in federal court under the Federal Dilution Act of 1995 and the AntiCybersquatting Act of 1998.
389 Law firms frequently report individual ìvictoriesî in their web site marketing
materials. A number of law firms compile cyberlaw verdicts won by other firms.
390 The UCLA Online Institute for Cyberspace Law and Policy compiles the leading
Internet law cases by year. The UCLA Online Institute for Cyberspace Law and Policy, at
http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/iclp/hp.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2004). The Berkman Center
for Internet & Society at Harvard Law School was also searched. The Berkman Center for
Internet & Society, at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
391 An online database of all Internet-related annotations in American Law Reports
(ìALRî) was extensively searched.
392 My content analysis of reported cases focused upon Cyber Tech & E-Commerce:
Mealeyís Litigation Report, Emerging Insurance Disputes: Mealeyís Litigation Report,
Intellectual Property: Mealeyís Litigation Report, Litigation: Mealeyís Combined Reports,
Patents: Mealeyís Litigation Report, and Trademarks: Mealeyís Litigation Report.
393 I searched the commercial law, computer law, and e-commerce secondary
literature. I conducted searches of Matthew Benderís UCC Reporter and Digest as well as
the following Bender treatises: E-Commerce and Communications: Transactions in
Digital Information, Nimmer on Copyright, Gilson on Trademark Protection & Practice,
Intellectual Property Counseling and Litigation, Computer Contracts, Computer Law,
and Law of the Internet.
394 During the period of the study, I updated four editions of the E-Business Legal
Handbook (2003). All of the cases uncovered in each yearís edition were included in the
research universe. Other treatises searched were: Julian S. Millstein et. al., DOING
BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET (2002); Kevin J. Connolly, LAW OF INTERNET OF SECURITY &
PRIVACY (2002); Ian Ballon, E-COMMERCE & INTERNET LAW (2001).
395 The principal source here was the LEXIS library of legal news newsletters and
publications. However, I also surveyed the general news databases as well as the
combined news databases from the states compiled by WESTLAW. WESTLAW includes
all Dow Jones magazines, newspapers, and wires, as well as other magazine databases.
Both services have extensive libraries of newswires and news services providing
additional information on case developments.
396 Corporate annual reports to shareholders were examined on LEXISís FEDSEC
database, as well as the SEC Edgar databases. Companies are required to disclose
pending or settlement cases that may affect stock prices. LEXIS has complete SEC filings
and exhibits in its online database.
397 Newspapers and popular magazines were analyzed on many LEXIS and
WESTLAW databases.
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and information services.398 The sample excludes all criminal
cases as well as dispositions for convicted offenders who are
challenging the constitutionality of Internet postings of their
The sample
criminal records and personal information.399
excluded Internet-related small claims actions because there is
no reliable reporting service.400 The sample does not include
discovery orders to produce computer tapes or other information.
The dataset does not include disputes decided under alternative
dispute resolution such as the Uniform Domain Name Resolution
Policy.
Furthermore, the sample does not include criminal
prosecutions, regulatory actions brought by governmental units,
or bankruptcies. Regulatory, criminal, and dot-com insolvency
involves the government as the adjudicator of rights. These
public law subjects are sharply different than private litigation,
so they will be examined in a separate article.401 The focus of
this Article is on the role of private litigants in Internet
litigation. Foreign litigants are included only to the extent that
actions are tried in U.S. state and federal courts.

398 I systematically searched the extensive collection of computer law and cyberlaw
publications on LEXIS and WESTLAW. Sources include: all Andrew Publications
Newsletters on Internet-related topics, Computer Law Newsletters, Leader Publications
Newsletters, and the published outlines of the Practicing Law Institute.
399 This Article focuses on civil litigation rather than criminal or quasi-criminal
cyberspace cases where the plaintiff was a governmental agency or prosecutor.
400 In the state of Washington, there are newspaper reports of small claims courts
ordering commercial e-mailers to compensate consumers. However, the complete absence
of written opinions or other records makes it impossible to determine what role these
informal tribunals play in the overall picture.
401 The research includes a content analysis of every FTC litigation report and SEC
litigation release from 1995 to 2003. The FTC asserts broad investigative and law
enforcement authority to police Internet fraud. The FTC uncovers many of its cases by
enlisting volunteers to surf web sites in order to uncover get rich schemes, false
advertising, miracle cures, privacy infractions, online pyramid schemes, credit card billing
schemes, and other deceptive sales practices. Most FTC actions are based on the
Commissionís broad enforcement authority to restrain ìunfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.î 15 U.S.C. ß 45(a)(1) (2003). Similarly, the SEC has
been active in extending federal securities law to the enforcement of predatory, anti-fraud
and anti-competitive practices in cyberspace. SEC actions may be brought for insider
trading, pyramid schemes, fraudulent investment opportunities, and false and misleading
information about securities and the companies that issue them. U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).

